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ABSTRACT
NASA seeks to reliably detect potential Earth Impactors (EI) in time to defend
the planet by deflecting them. Congress has given an unfunded mandate to NASA to
lead Spaceguard, a coalition of worldwide observatories and scientists who find, track,
and determine impact probabilities for potential EIs (Udall, 2007). This effort fits
within the first stages of a typical military targeting cycle, which begins by detecting
and characterizing targets. In the first half of this analysis, military targeting is applied
to the EI challenge through the development of a methodology to characterize early
warning times for different size objects. In the second half, recommendations for
acting on different warning time scenarios are presented, to include augmentation of
observation technology and use of a precursor transponder implantation mission.
An interdisciplinary approach is taken to measure the success of the Spaceguard
efforts in increasing the warning times for approaches of variously sized bodies. A
multi-step method is developed, beginning with determining past and present warning
times for asteroids entering the 0.05 AU Astronomical Unit (AU) Minimum Orbit
Intersection Distance (MOID) of Earth. Using source data from NASA’s NEO
Program database of close approaches, JPL’s Small Body Database, and the IAU Minor
Planet Center, the differences between the dates of first discovery of these Potentially
Hazardous Asteroids (PHA) and the dates of 7300 penetrations of the MOID to graph
warning times for known PHAs’ penetration of the MOID were aggregated. The

xiii

method also includes the estimate of PHA discovery, rates of objects with high orbital
uncertainties, and missed approach rates. A discussion of potential sources for error
and directions to take for further development of the model is included. Finally,
recommendations for campaigns against EIs are provided, given different warning time
and size scenarios.
The most significant of the conclusions is that, given current technology, and
given the limitations of the model used, the 100-300 m size range appears to contain the
most likely EI Spaceguard will discover with enough warning time (over 30 years) to
take some form of action. A counterintuitive additional conclusion is that this size
range also may yield an object that will strike with no warning time. Another
conclusion is that EIs smaller than 100 m will provide negligible warning time for
centuries.
Targeting campaigns against the most-likely EI warning-time and size scenarios
are discussed. These campaigns include first, additional observation technology;
second, an inexpensive short-termed precursor transponder mission; third, a long-term
observation mission; fourth, a suite of simultaneous observation and mitigation
missions, and finally, evacuation and recovery operations. The overall conclusion is
that additional resources should be allocated toward more robust survey technology, the
first layer of defense, with continued development of precursor characterizationtransponder mission technology, the second layer of defense.

xiv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Prologue
A host of U.S. government organizations have been allocated billions of dollars
to ensure that an adversarial nation or terrorist group never detonates a nuclear warhead
on U.S. territory. This mission is vital and brings correspondingly vital amounts of
funding. Yet funding allocations towards planetary defense against multi-megaton
asteroid strikes have been relatively trivial, despite the fact that within the past thirty
years the world has begun to awaken to the Near Earth Object (NEO) threat. We now
understand that a countdown is taking place for an explosion larger than any nuclear
device. We do not know how long the countdown will be or where the destruction will
take place; we only know that a NEO will strike with a Tunguska or greater-size impact
somewhere inside the next few centuries.
Several deadly NEOs are currently on this destructive path, their orbital

parameters configured such that they will impact Earth with devastating results.
Will we take the necessary steps to find these objects in time to defend ourselves

against them? Will we augment Spaceguard’s effort to find, and catalogue, track and
maintain the orbits of the tens of thousands of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHA)?
Will we design campaigns of space missions to characterize, track, and later mitigate
the incoming projectiles? Earth-Impactors (EI) are a natural hazard that humans may
1

have the knowledge and ability to overcome, given sufficient budgetary resources.
Political will and widespread understanding of the true nature of the threat is necessary
to make this happen.
Overview
The development of a methodology for answering two questions is central to the
first half of this thesis. The first question the methodology is developed to answer is:
for space mission design planning purposes, what is the most likely size of the next
impactor with enough warning time to take substantive action against it? Secondly,
what will average warning times for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID around the
Earth be in the future? An approach to answering these questions is developed to better
define the specific threat from NEOs. The approach is applied using inputs that are
acknowledged to contain errors; however, as some inputs are refined by NASA and
further research in the community, the method might eventually yield accurate and
applicable results.
The second half of this thesis uses the results from an attempted application of
the method to provide targeting campaign recommendations. This analysis is an
interdisciplinary approach to the impactor problem set. The thesis contains discussion
throughout about the success of NASA’s NEO Program and Spaceguard and the
revolution it has brought to providing advanced warning of an Earth Impactor. It also
contains a projection of what future warning times will look like as NASA’s efforts
continue, if no new funding or technological innovations are added to the current
regiment.
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The primary method used for the first section was a compilation of early
warnings for penetrations of the 0.05 Astronomical Unit (AU) Minimum Orbit
Intersection Distance (MOID) as analogous to actual impact. Discovery dates for all
known PHAs came from one NASA database, and all known close approaches from
another. These were binned by size and time, and used to calculate the warning times
for these close approaches. Estimates were then made for missed approaches, or
approaches of objects that have not been discovered, and projected discovery rates of
new bodies. Finally, estimates for the number of PHAs whose orbital uncertainty is too
high to allow for long term projection were incorporated, counted them as “Level 2
PHAs” in the model, essentially considering them to be “lost in a sense.”
The 0.05 AU distance from the Earth is used for warning time estimates
throughout this paper. While there are differences between this and warning times for
actual impact, it is used as a proxy for impacting warning times. The warning time for
0.05 AU penetration represents the time that will be available for initial decisions for
action against each PHA close approach to the Earth. In a layered approach to
planetary defense, every penetration of 0.05 AU from Earth should be considered a
situation requiring a decision to be made. The decisions will involve one of the
following mission campaigns, depending on the time left, the errors in the trajectory’s
ellipse, and resource allocation:
1. Ignore the penetrator for the time being. If there are already enough
observations to demonstrate that the incoming body will not threaten the Earth,
resources need not be focused towards this object for planetary defense purposes.
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2. Focus additional ground based telescopes at the object. If the trajectory is
only known well enough to project out a few decades or centuries, the object might
merit further observation to ascertain future potential as an EI.
3. Focus RADAR assets on the object, if the error ellipse is large enough to
have some probability of hitting Earth or entering a gravitational keyhole, or if the
object is large enough to cause global catastrophic damage.
4. Launch a precursor characterization/transponder mission. If the uncertainty
is low and the object has a reasonable chance of impacting, a transponder mission
should be launched to refine the orbit of the object. This mission might simultaneously
characterize the objects mass, density distribution, shape, and composition.
5. Launch near-simultaneous observation and mitigation missions. If the
warning time is low and the object trajectory is uncertain enough that it has a
reasonable possibility of impacting the Earth, it may necessitate the launch of a
transponder-characterization-observation mission right before or at the same time as an
attempted deflection mission. This observation mission would also carry out postimpact assessment of the object, analogous to USAF application of Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA) to determine if a bombed target still remains a threat. Following
this post-impact assessment, the object might require further deflection attempts.
6. Evacuation. If warning times are too low for deflection, ground and spacebased assets should be rapidly focused towards refining the final approach of the object,
in an effort to determine the most likely impact region for full scale evacuation.
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7. Recovery operations. If warning time is zero and the object strikes, NASA
and Spaceguard will be largely out of the picture, as FEMA and other organizations
take over.
Earth Impact decisions involve weighing uncertainties and risks versus
resource allocation. These decisions, if they begin at the outer layers of defense, can
save time and resources later. Therefore, with every 0.05 AU approach, a decision,
whether automated or human, must be made within the time between detection and
approach. With every repeated entrance within 0.05 AU of the Earth’s MOID, a
decision to carry out one of the above steps should be taken.
The remainder of Chapter I describes the environment by defining key terms
used throughout, discussing the relevance of warning times, introducing Spaceguard,
describing the policy and funding environment for the program, and providing an
overview of the current Potentially Hazardous Asteroid (PHA) population. Also
provided are estimates of damage potential for different sizes of PHAs, given
population density distributions on the Earth; this is important for understanding the
relevance of different sizes of EIs.
Chapter II provides the methodology used for estimation of 0.05 AU approach
warning times. This includes several data points required to build the model. Chapter
III provides the results of the model in the form of graphs and charts of estimated future
warning times for 0.05 AU penetrations. It also contains a discussion of sources of
error for the model.
Chapter IV contains an application of the results of Chapter III. It specifically
contains an analysis of how a transponder mission is an important key element of the
5

layered defense approach to planetary defense, second only to ground and space-based
observation. Once Spaceguard finds a threatening NEO, and all ground observation
mechanisms are exhausted, a precursor transponder mission could be critical to
determine if the NEO is indeed an impactor. A transponder mission, whether placed
onto the NEO, in orbit around it, or trailing it, could provide enough orbital accuracy to
make a final determination as to whether a potentially expensive deflection mission is
necessary. Additionally, should an attempt at deflection take place, a transponderobservation mission would be vital to obtain post-deflection assessment to determine
whether the object still threatens the Earth. For this reason, a substantial part of
Chapter IV addresses the transponder mission concept, to include a discussion of the
top three winners of the Planetary Society’s Apophis Mission Design Competition for
transponder missions.
Chapter IV also contains a discussion of the DoD targeting cycle and its
application against NEOs, to include how a transponder mission would fit within the
DoD targeting cycle. The author, who spent part of his military career involved in the
targeting campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq, sees similarities between the targeting
processes used in the DoD with what must be used to face the next threatening EI.
Chapter IV uses this concept and provides analysis and recommendations for targeting
campaigns against EIs, given different warning times and sizes.
Chapter V contains an overall discussion of the findings and the campaigns. The
current vulnerabilities associated with underfunding of Spaceguard are discussed,
focusing primarily on the long-term lack of adequate warning times for bodies smaller
than 300 m. It also contains an analysis of each size bin, and some final words on the
6

need for better and more observation technology. Finally, it contains a discussion of
future potential improvement on the methods used in this analysis.
Key Terminology
Most terminology used is standard within the NEO community; however, some
new terms had to be introduced that are specific to this model. Key terms are as
follows:
Near-Earth Object (NEO)- Asteroid or comet with perihelion distance less than
1.3 Astronomical Units (AU) (NASA NEO-P website, 2012)
Near-Earth Asteroid (NEA)- The asteroid subset of NEOs; this represents the
vast majority of NEOs (NASA NEO-P website, 2012).
Potentially Hazardous Asteroid (PHA)- NEA whose Minimum Orbit
Intersection Distance (MOID) with Earth is 0.05 AU (7.5 million km) or less and
whose absolute magnitude is less than 22.0 (H < 22.0) (NASA NEO-P website, 2012).
PHAs are the main focus of this study, although asteroids whose magnitudes are greater
than 22.0 (H > 22.0) are also included.
Earth Impactor (EI)- Asteroid or comet that strikes the Earth (NASA NEO-P
website, 2012). This study is confined to asteroids only, as they are both a more
common danger to Earth and a more surmountable challenge. Comets, with their
extremely high eccentricities, are much more difficult to predict and represent a threat
that may require several centuries of technological growth to reliably mitigate.
Actionable EI- For the purposes of this paper, an actionable EI is one that is
detected with enough time to potentially take additional ground observations,
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implement a precursor transponder mission, mitigate if necessary, and carry out a postmitigation assessment mission.
Mitigation- an attempt to reduce the threat of a possible EI. In this paper,
mitigation can include, and is often used interchangeably with, “deflection.”
Warning Time- For the purposes of this paper, Early Warning and Warning
Time are the time between first detection and a close approach within the 0.05 AU
MOID. As the Spaceguard effort grows, these warning times will grow significantly
for objects over 300 m in diameter. Objects smaller than 300 m, as discussed in
Chapter IV, will require improvement in observational technology to produce
consistently long warning times.
Known object- For the purposes of this paper, a known object is a NEA that has
been discovered and tracked.
Missed PHA- For the purposes of this paper, a missed PHA is a PHA that has
passed within the 0.05 AU MOID but that has not been observed or discovered. Such
objects can only be estimated.
Missed approaches- For the purposes of this paper, missed approaches are the
estimated number of approaches within the 0.05 AU MOID from missed PHAs.
Spaceguard period- A 14 year period, for the purposes of this paper. Because
our analysis began with a study of the success of the Spaceguard from its congressional
mandate in 1998 to the end of 2011 (the date of download of all data), equal 14 year
periods are used in the future projections of approach warning times.
Level 1 PHAs- For the purposes of this paper, Level 1 PHAs have low
uncertainty trajectories; these are objects with enough observational arc or observation
8

in enough oppositions that their orbital trajectories can be forward and back projected
for the entire period of 1900-2200.
Level 2 PHAs- For the purposes of this paper, Level 2 PHAs are high
uncertainty PHAs. These are objects with insufficient observations to project their
orbits reliably more than one Spaceguard period forward or backward; in other words,
objects whose orbits provide less than 14 years certainty in either time direction. These
objects cannot be back- or forward- calculated with enough certainty to know whether
or not they will enter the 0.05 AU MOID again or have entered it in the past. They are,
in our model, considered “lost”. They result from insufficient observation, and occur
mainly in objects of high H values. The term “Level 2” is used rather than “lost”
however, because lost objects have other specific definitions in the NEO community.
Timothy Spahr, head of the Minor Planet Center, explains that even though objects
with high uncertainty are lost in the sense of not being able to point a small telescope at
them, “they will be identified when they are accidentally re-found years later.” (T.
Spahr, personal communication, Feb 2, 2012).
The Relevance of Warning Times
Warning times for earth-impacting bodies have historically been far less than
zero. The vast majority of small body impactor evidence has been discovered well
after impact. Examples of impacts that occurred without warning include the impact 50
thousand years ago that produced Arizona’s well-preserved Meteor Crater; the impact
65 million years ago that exterminated most dinosaur species on Earth, allowing
mammals to rise; and the meteorite that struck the east coast of North America 35
million years ago, resulting in the Chesapeake Bay’s location and shape (Poag, 1999, p.
9

57). Unlike other major impacts, the recently discovered Chesapeake impact shows
evidence of a mass extinction having occurred well after the impact; Poag conjectures
that this counterintuitive result delayed mass extinction might have come from creating
a “pulse of greenhouse warming in the midst of the long-term global cooling trend”
(Poag, 1999, p. 102). Although the theory of delayed extinction merits investigation,
the typical multi-kilometer Earth Impactor (EI) provides no such postponement to
Armageddon. Each of the five largest impact-induced mass extinctions, occurring 438,
360, 245, 208, and 65 million years ago, “decimated 50-95 percent of the species living
at those times” (Poag, 1999, p. 83).
However, as frightening as the stories of species-ending EIs may be, NASA
announced at the end of 2011 that 93% of these large (> 1 km) NEOs have been found
(Clavin & Brown, 2011) through the efforts of Spaceguard. To date, NASA has not
found a projected collision within that set of NEOs for the next several centuries. This
accomplishment, and the work of scientists worldwide in support of it, should be
considered one of the more significant achievements of recent times. NASA could
continue to refine its orbital prediction on these bodies out to several hundreds of
millennia to determine if any very large body is destined to be an EI. If such an
impactor were found, it would be an extraordinary gift to the planet if our species could
find a way to prevent it from eventual impact.
At the other end of the spectrum, very small asteroids strike the Earth
frequently. A recent event more understandable within the human concept of time is
the 1908 Tunguska event, a multi-megaton size explosion which, without warning,
leveled a swath of Siberian forest. A less threatening example was a smaller iron
10

meteorite fall in the Sikhote-Alin region of Siberia in 1948 (Morrison, 2005, p. 93).
Another occurred in 2009, when a very small asteroid (on the order of 10 m) penetrated
the atmosphere, detonating over an island region of Indonesia in a daytime blast with
the energy of about 50 kilotons, roughly three times the energy of the Hiroshima atomic
explosion. The dust cloud remnants were easily visible from the ground and can be
viewed on Youtube.com (Silber, 2009, p. 1). Fortunately, the object did not penetrate
far enough to cause any destruction, although an object only two-three times as large,
such as the Tunguska EI, could have had a more devastating local effect.
Warning times for approaches of asteroids that have missed the Earth have
been, like warning times for impact, predominantly close to zero. Every few days
small objects approach to within the 0.05 AU of the Earth. The growing body of
observational evidence within the past few decades has taught us that our planet is
swimming in an ocean of small bodies, whose impacts are shielded only by our
relatively thin atmosphere and the vastness of space. Many such bodies pass by
undetected, their fleeting close approaches occurring at high velocities relative to the
Earth, fast enough to cause enormous damage if they strike the Earth. According to
Daniels (2009), astronomers from the LINEAR program discovered a new 100 m

diameter NEO on June 17, 2002 that had passed approximately 120,000 km from Earth,
well inside the Moon’s orbit. Daniels states, “Perhaps more alarming was the fact that
the discovery took place three days after the asteroid flew by” (Daniels, 2009, p. 126).
A 2008 publicly released U.S. Air Force report described a more promising
event; in July 2008, a binary NEO (2008 BT18) consisting of a 600 m NEO with a 200
m smaller object passed within 6 lunar distances of Earth. This set of NEOs, easily
11

capable of large regional devastation, was discovered in January of 2008, six months
prior to fly by (Air Force Future Concepts and Transformation Division (AF/A8XC),
2008, p. 9) This is promising in that the detection actually provided time for some form
of action, even if only evacuation. It also raises attention to the question- what could be
accomplished in such a short period of time? Movies such as Armageddon display
astronauts deploying nuclear weapons on incoming EIs with only days to weeks of
preparation, saving the world from certain destruction. These movies depict a situation
in which the world knows of the EI in time for a crash mitigation program, and assumes
that the government has such a crash mitigation program already in place.
However, a crash mitigation programs would likely take several years to
decades to implement. Most of the core understanding of the required technology
exists- launch vehicles, kinetic and nuclear impactors, precursor transponder missionsbut assembly of such technologies in a crash effort would require time we might not
have. Aside from technology, the relationship of the orbit of the EI with that of the
Earth is also critical. As then NASA administrator Mike Griffin stated in his 2005
Testimony to Congress:
It is estimated that a 30-year advance warning would be required to have a
reasonable assurance of deflecting a NEO from a collision with Earth. Thus, if
a future impactor were identified today, the time to explore the characteristics of
the NEO, develop a deflection system, deliver it to the NEO, and apply the
deflection early enough to prevent an impact, requires about a 3-decade lead
time (as cited in AF/A8XC 2008, 13).
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This estimate of 30 years, while somewhat arbitrary, is loosely based on the time to
design and implement a crash deflection mission, the transit time, and the time required
to change the course of the asteroid. In reality, a deflection mission could take less
time with enough political will. However, because of trajectory uncertainties, political
will may not have the force necessary to press for a deflection mission without at least
30 years of time. The reason behind this is that additional ground observations are
required, followed by a precursor transponder mission to determine whether the object
will indeed impact. Once the impact probability becomes high enough, political will
can become strong enough to press for a crash deflection mission. However, the time
necessary for the added ground observations and the precursor mission will take a
significant part of the early warning time available up. A transponder mission alone
might take seven years, not counting design and implementation as discussed in
Chapter IV. This underscores the importance of better characterization of target
warning times and sizes. Beyond the Hollywood and History channel portrayals, what
is the true nature of the threat? How big will an impactor be, and how long will we
have to react to it?
Preliminary Summary of Results
Figure 1 is example of one of the results of this work- a graph of projected 0.05
AU warning times for objects of approximately 500-1000 m diameters.
Charts for other size bins are found in Chapter III “Results”. The following is
a brief overview of what they convey. For PHAa with diameters larger than 1000 m (as
estimated from H values) not surprisingly, the Spaceguard effort has increased warning
times for the majority of PHAs entering the 0.05 AU MOID to several decades, and
13

even centuries. There is a negligible chance that the next near-term EI will come from
this size-bin. However, due to the species threatening nature of this size bin, efforts
should continue to ensure that all objects in this population are eventually accounted
for, with orbits defined well enough to project out tens of thousands of years. It is still
a little early in the process to declare absolute victory.

Figure 1. Histogram for 500-1000 m 0.05 AU Warning Times.
This plot indicates that warning times prior to entry within 0.05 AU of the Earth may
be on average greater than 30 years in the 2012-2025 Spaceguard period (purple).
After 2054, all 500-1000 m objects are likely to provide well over 60 years warning
time. Prediction accuracy is limited by the inputs to the methodology.
For PHAs in size bin 500-1000 m (by H Value) should become actionable,
meaning that a precursor transponder mission and/or deflection mission would be
possible, by 2026 at current rates.. If an EI is discovered within the next 14 years, there
is only a small chance that it will be from this part of the population, because so few are
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left in this population relative to smaller sizes. Most PHAs in the 300- 500 m size bin
(as estimated from H values) will be discovered and will have well defined orbits at
current rates by around 2040.
PHAs by H value that are roughly100- 300m in diameter provide a more
complex scenario. Even with currently high discovery rates in this size bin, the
majority of these bodies still pass by unseen, providing virtually no warning time for
many decades to come at current rates. Moreover, many of these are not observed long
enough to bring uncertainty levels down to allow for accurate future orbital predictions.
The weaker orbital elements established therefore “only allow prediction intervals of a
few decades or less” (S. Chesley, personal communication, January 29, 2012).
However, there are many objects in this size bin, so there is a reasonable chance that
the next actionable EI will be discovered in this part of the population. So many are
discovered that the low percentage with well-established trajectories outnumber high
certainty discoveries in all other size bins. Therefore, this size bin holds a reasonable
chance of providing an EI that will have over 30 years of warning time.
Objects smaller than 100 m have on average less than zero warning times for
0.05 AU MOID penetrations, meaning that they are often discovered days or months
after their close approaches. With no technological improvements, this will continue
for centuries due to two factors. First, this size bin has by far the highest population of
objects, more than all the other size bins combined. It will therefore take a very long
time for completion of the population, even if every discovered object had high orbital
certainties. Second, very few of the objects have high trajectory certainties. While a
high number of objects in this bin are discovered every year, only around 5% (as
15

derived later) have adequate certainty in their orbits to forward project more than a
couple of decades, with current technology. This bin represents by far the most likely
from which the next surprise EI will be drawn. But there is also a reasonable chance
that if an actionable EI (over 30 years warning time) is discovered, it will come from
this size bin.
Knowing this, we can focus our action on the most likely situations in the

next few decades, which include discovering an actionable EI within the 100-300

m size bin, followed by the 300-500 m and 25-100 m size bins.

These rates are for the next actionable EI, providing potentially enough time to

react and launch a precursor or mitigation mission. The most likely next impactor in
absolute terms is still not actionable, and is to be found within the smallest size bin (25100 m). Without significant technological advancement, these Tunguska-type events
will provide no warning times for several centuries.
Campaigns can be designed for each of these eventualities, and these are the
subject of Chapter IV. The methodology presented here does contain sources of error,
principally in the estimates for the total number of PHAs; the results will doubtless
therefore have some error associated with them. It is even possible that this error could
be magnified in some cases (as discussed in Chapter IV). If the error turns out to be
relatively manageable, the results could indicate that NASA should design long-term
campaigns for objects in the 100-300 m, 300-500 m, and 25-100 m size range, in that
order of precedence for now. This order will change within the next 2-3 decades, as
the 300-500 m objects are discovered, eliminating them from the pool of potential EIs.
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Long warning time targeting campaigns should first seek to increase knowledge
of the orbital probabilities through ground observations, followed by a relatively lowbudget precursor transponder mission and, if necessary, followed by an additional more
expensive suite of long-term (multi-year) observation missions, which would provide
pre-and post-mitigation assessment.
Spaceguard and the Near Earth Object Program
Only in recent years has human technological understanding advanced to the
point at which substantive warning of impact events has moved from the realm of
science fiction to the truly plausible. Such warning times have become significant for
objects over 1000 m in diameter only during the last 14 years, since the 1998 NASA
adoption of the Spaceguard Survey concept. Chapman and Morrison proposed such a
survey in 1992 in a congressionally requested NASA study (Morrison, 2005, pp. 8788). This study, advocating the search for asteroids larger than 1-2 km in diameter, was
further supported by a 1995 NASA study chaired by Gene Shoemaker, who “described
a practical way to carry out such a Spaceguard Survey using modest-sized groundbased telescopes equipped with modern electronic detectors and computer systems”
(Morrison, 2005, p. 88). NASA proceeded to establish its Near Earth Object Program
(NEO-P) in 1998 with the congressionally mandated goal of finding 90% of NEOs over
1000 m in diameter.
In 2003, NASA carried out a “Study to Determine the Feasibility of Extending
the Search for Near-Earth Objects to Smaller Limiting Diameters.” A cross-section of
the NEO community conducted the study, which advocated the allocation of additional
resources to find, track, and forward project the orbits of over 90% of NEOs larger than
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140 meters within no more than 20 years, at costs ranging between $236 million and
$397 million. The study emphasized that “NEO search performance is generally not
driven by technology but rather resources.” (NASA: Near Earth Object Science
Definition Team, 2003, p. iv)
Following this, Congress directed NASA, without providing additional funds, to
implement a NEO survey program, “for objects as small as 140 meters in size in the
NASA Authorization Act of 2005.” (Udall, 2007, p. 2007) According to Lindley
Johnson, Program Executive for the Planetary Science Division, which oversees NEOP, congress allocated NASA an additional $2M in 1998 to start the program. In all
other years up to and including 2009, NASA took the funding for NEO-P, amounting to
an average of $4M per year in real year dollars, out of its Planetary Science research
and analysis budget. In 2010, congress appropriated an additional $2M above NASA’s
requested budget as an earmark to fund the radar operations at Arecibo (L. Johnson,
personal communication, Feb 12, 2012), the National Science Foundation’s (NSF)
high-powered radar in Puerto Rico. NASA is, in effect, leading the worldwide
planetary defense effort from its science budget.
In FY11 NASA sought to establish a separate funding line amounting to a 400%
increase to $20.4M for NEO-P in its budget request, although that budget was never
acted on by congress. At the behest of the Obama administration, NASA again put a
separate funding line for $20.4M towards NEO-P in its FY2012 budget request to
congress. This support likely came because of a National Research Council (NRC)
report published in January of 2010 that “finally convinced most everyone that more
effort should be spent in this area” (L. Johnson, personal communication, Feb 12,
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2012). Perhaps in a few hundred years, the relatively minor amounts of US
Government funds allocated to Spaceguard will be viewed as the most cost-effective
dollars spent on government programs in the 21st century. However, should a
damaging strike occur, the view would likely be that the congress and administrations
were at fault for providing comparatively very little funding towards a significant
mission. Only $4 million per year (and more recently $20.4 million/yr) has been
allocated towards discovery, tracking, modeling, and software development for the
NEO Program. While this sum may prevent unpredicted impacts from the large
objects, it may not suffice to provide adequate warning for objects below 300 m in
diameter in the near future. The number of objects below 300 m is higher than all the
size ranges above 300 m combined, and objects in this range can still cause local or
regional catastrophic damage. Furthermore, without an eventual space-based
infrastructure, the relatively low percentage threat from comets will always be present.
Given the minor budget allocated to Spaceguard, the results have nevertheless
been excellent and have provided confidence that it may eventually be possible to
predict most EIs down to 140 m with enough warning time to take action. On Oct 6,
2008, some immediate proof for a success of the effort came when part of the
Spaceguard infrastructure detected 2008 TC3 19 hours before it exploded 37 km over
the Sudan. The automated Catalina Sky Survey telescope at Mount Lemmon, Arizona,
discovered the object, which had a magnitude H=30.9+/- 0.1, something virtually
impossible to do 20 years prior. Incredibly, orbital solutions from ground observations
were able to accurately predict the location of impact in the Nubian Desert, and the
above ground explosion was visible to eyewitnesses on the ground and US government
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satellites (Jenniskens, 2009, p. 485). Estimates of the size of 2008 TC3 indicate it was
only a few meters in diameter. It was not massive enough to strike the ground with
substantive remaining kinetic energy, although a total of 3.95 kg of its post-explosion
mass made it to the ground unexpectedly. 2008 TC3 is very relevant to the topic of
warning times for one significant reason: although no current technology could have
mitigated this EI in the time available, the very fact that Spaceguard’s Catalina Sky
Survey discovered 2008 TC3 prior to impact at all is inaugural. Until then, no EI had
ever been detected several hours prior to reaching the ground. This detection was a
direct result of Spaceguard’s growing capabilities, both technologically and
organizationally.
Detecting small bodies hours prior to impact could be vital for evacuation of a
target area and shows immediate promise for the future. And the Spaceguard effort is
working to detect potential EI events years, decades, and even centuries prior to impact,
in time to send a deflection mission, or even a precursor characterization/ observation
mission prior to a deflection mission.
The Relevance of Size
The size of a threatening EI is intertwined with its warning times. Size also
matters for campaign plans, damage predictions for impact, evacuation plans, post
impact recovery plans, and deflection methodology. The population count for NEAs
and PHAs may be inversely correlated to the diameter, with the vast majority of objects
measuring under 100 m in diameter, and only around a thousand greater than 1 km.
Small PHAs, while more common than large ones, are also more difficult to detect and
track. Small PHAs often have orbital uncertainties so high that predictions out a
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decade or two are difficult or impossible. In our model, these bodies with high orbital
uncertainties are referred to as “Level 2 PHAs”; these PHAs are counted as essentially
lost, because no adequate warning time will come with such high uncertainties.
The Current Population
The method and results in Chapters II and III required the use of population data
throughout the analysis. Much of this population data came from NEOWISE.
NEOWISE is the asteroid detection add-on to the Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer
(WISE) mission, which surveyed the entire celestial sky while orbiting in Low-Earth
Orbit over the course of 12 months (NASA Press Conference, 2011). WISE was
designed to look for stars and galaxies, but a side benefit of its scans was a large
amount of data collection on NEOs. WISE scanned in the infrared (IR) part of the
spectrum. NEOWISE data shows an estimated 19,500 mid-sized (100-1000 meter)
NEOs, potentially threatening our planet with local or regional devastation, down from
35,000 previously estimated (NASA Press Conference, 2011). PHAs are a subset of
these NEOs, discussed later. Asteroids, due to their varying albedos, can appear
smaller to optical telescopes than they really are, and the IR scans of WISE alleviated
this problem. The NEOWISE estimates did not apply to NEOs smaller than 100 m in
diameter, which from previous studies are thought to number close to 1 million (NASA
Press Conference, 2011). Other analysis of the NEOWISE data showed that 93% of the
larger than 1 km NEOs have been discovered. Significantly, none of these appears to
threaten the Earth for the foreseeable future (NASA Press Conference, 2011). Figure 2
represents the NEOWISE count.
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Figure 2. NEO Population.
This figure shows the total discovered objects in brown, and the total predicted objects
in green. Each image represents 100 objects. Previous estimates are in blue. The
brown and green estimates are used in this analysis. For objects under 100 m,
NEOWISE was not used for estimates. Image credit (NASA/JPL-Caltech, 2011).
Size bins in this study are the same sizes used in the NEOWISE program, for
consistency. These bins range from the largest PHAs (> 1 km) down to a minimum of
25 m, below which most objects will burn up prior to impact. Time bins are based on
the period beginning with the congressionally mandated effort to find objects over 1000
m and ending after the NEOWISE study was completed, by the end of 2011. This 14
year period is called, for the purposes of this paper, a Spaceguard period.
Another useful source of data for the NEO/PHA populations was the NEA SizeFrequency Distribution chart (L. Johnson, personal communication, January 5, 2012)
found in NASA’s 2003 NEO Science Definition Team report, as updated by Mainzer et
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al. with the NEOWISE data in 2011. The updated diagram, included below, gives
several approximations of the number of objects for various sizes as well as their
destructive energy levels and approximate impact intervals. Different investigators
carried out these approximations with very different methods to include the use of lunar
cratering records, bias correction of controlled surveys, ratios of re-detections versus
new discoveries, relative bias estimates, infrasound, and orbiting infrared sensors
detecting bolide impacts on the upper atmosphere (NASA: Near Earth Object Science
Definition Team, 2003, p. 17). Results from NEOWISE indicate that the “cumulative
size distribution is best represented by a broken power law with a slope of 1.32+/below 1.5 km” (Mainzer, et al., 2011, p. 3). This was used as the lower bound for the
number of PHAs less than 100 m.
Using data from the NEOWISE count in Figure 2 and the NEA Frequency
count in Figure 3, specifically using the 1.32 power law as the lower bound and the
constant power law as the upper for under 100 m, the following Table was produced.
This table contains the total number of estimated NEAs and the total number of
detected NEAs as of the end of 2011. The third row is a simple percentage of the total
number that has been discovered.
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Figure 3. NEA Frequency, Absolute Magnitude, Size, Impact Interval and Energy Plot.
This plot shows, on the left side, the estimated number of NEAs larger than a given size.
Also indicated are the impact intervals and impact energies for given size ranges. H to
size conversion at the bottom uses an albedo estimate of 0.14. Image credit (NASA NEO
Science Definition Team as updated by Mainzer et al., 2011)
Table 1. Population Overview, December 31 2011.
>1km
Estimated Total NEAs

981*

500m1km
1500*

301m500m
2400*

100m300m
15,700*

25m100m
50,0001M**
3000
.6%

NEAs Detected to date
912
1200
1100
2000
% NEAs detected as of Dec
93%
80%
46%
13%
2011
* from NEOWISE graphic
** from NASA NEO Science Definition Team graphic- high uncertainties in this size
range

Note: The above table provides estimates of the total NEAs in the given size ranges as well as
the NEAs detected in those size-ranges as of the end of 2011. The third row displays the
percent completeness of the population.
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Damage Potential for Various Sizes of EIs
Another critical element of any thorough NEA targeting study is damage
potential. Understanding damage potential helps us to understand better what courses
of action should be taken given different warning time scenarios.
Impacts by NEAs larger than 1 km are both extremely devastating and
extremely rare. Most of these objects have been found, and none of those found are on
path to strike our planet for at least several centuries. If such an object did strike, the
impact would be the “destruction of a region or ocean rim; potential worldwide climate
shock, approaching global civilization destruction level” (Chapman, 2003, p. 3). The
object that killed off the dinosaurs after their very long reign was potentially 6 km in
diameter, although its size varies by study. NEAs in the 500-1000 m range would also
be devastating on both land and water at the regional if not global scale, depending
upon which end of that size bin an EI comes from.
NEAs in the 300-500 m range can create a large, deep crater on land and
devastation for a small nation (Chapman, 2003, p. 3). They could cause considerable
damage to a large nation, depending on the size, density, composition, entry angle, and
velocity. The effects also depend greatly on whether the impact takes place in a
populated area or rural area. A water strike from a NEO in this range anywhere in the
Atlantic could “devastate the coasts on both sides of the ocean by a tsunami over 100
meters high” (Hills, 1997, p. 1)
NEAs between 100 and 300 m in size have the capacity to create a devastating
air burst or a strike on the ground or ocean. A 200 m object contains the energy of 600
MT of TNT, the size of several of the largest nuclear weapons ever tested. On land,
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this would create “an enormous crater, 3 to 4 km across and deeper than the Grand
Canyon” (Chapman, 2003, p. 10). The death toll could range from the thousands to
millions. Ocean strikes are more likely because oceans cover 71 percent of the Earth’s
surface. A 200 m object striking the ocean could generate a tsunami in the 10 m range,
“comparable to the biggest ocean-wide tsunami recorded during recent centuries,”
(Chapman, 2003, p. 10), although Ward and Asphaug’s model shows that waves may
reach even as high as several hundred meters (Ward, 2000, p. 21). Because a large
percentage of the world’s populations live in coastal areas, an ocean strike could cause
significant casualties.
NEAs in the 25- 100 m range can cause Tunguska size devastation. The
damage will vary greatly, as does the strike frequency; a 30 m stony meteorite will not
bring near the devastation of a 30 m iron meteorite, which are significantly rarer, on the
order of 6% of falls (Emiliani, 1992, p. 152) Objects in this range, which constitute the
most frequent EIs, might damage or destroy on the order of 2,000 square km, as was
the case with Tunguska (Chapman, 2003, p. 12). These strikes happen frequently, once
every few centuries, but without an order of magnitude leap in technology, they are
likely to occur without warning. A saving grace is that water impacts, at least at the
lower end of this range, likely do negligible damage. (Chapman, 2003, p. 12) Also,
because the radius of damage is lower for smaller impactors, there is a reasonable
chance that an airburst over land would happen in a relatively unpopulated area. This
happened with Tunguska, but since 1908, human population has increased in many
rural and urban areas. Current populations have increased in non-arable land areas, so
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comprehensive modeling is required to give an accurate answer as to the danger of a
smaller strike.
Accurate damage/death estimates could come from models used by the US
Government (e.g. the Defense Threat Reduction Agency or the Department of Energy)
for modeling nuclear air-blast fatalities. Such models generally use population layers
and are more reliable than simple estimates of either inhabitable or arable land.
Without such a model, simple estimates are possible by using available population
predictions for urban and rural areas, but the error is much greater.
The use of estimates of “arable” land is tempting; however, such estimates
would likely contain a great deal of error, because today’s population extends to a
substantial portion of non-arable land. The United Nations projects that by 2030 some
1.1% of total land area, or a little over 1 million square kilometers, will contain 5
billion people (as cited in Angel 2005, p. 1). Assuming that NEAs have essentially the
same chance of striking anywhere on the Earth, this represents a .3% chance that an air
burst will happen over an area with average population density from 3-8,000 people per
square km. A very low probability percentage strike above a city, therefore, could
cause casualties on the order of 6-16 million people. The remaining land area will
contain the other approximately 3 billion people, with very low density distributions
from 0-1000+ people per km square.
Large swathes of land in Canada, Russia, and Australia are primarily
uninhabited. These areas take up some 34.5 million km2 of the available land mass.
Antarctica makes up another 14 million km2, and with a few much smaller countries
added in, the total land area with 0-10 population density/ km2 people amounts to
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roughly 60 million km2, or 41% of available land. There is a 12% chance of a strike in
these areas. The other 59% of land (17% of surface area) has a large range of
population densities. The following chart is a compilation of these data for a 25-100 m
strike, with current population estimates (2011-2012). It should be noted that with
rapidly rising populations, both the population density and areas with higher population
densities will likely increase.
Table 2. Casualty/Damage Potential 25-100 m (2011).
Area
Water
Sparsely populated land
(0-50/ km2)
Lightly to Moderately
populated
Heavily populated (3,0008,000/km2)

Chance of Strike
70.9%
12.1%
16.7%
0.3%

Potential Casualties/Damage
Little or no death/damage
0- 100,000 deaths/ little to no
damage
0-200,000 deaths/ little to
moderate damage
6-16 million deaths, billions of
$$ in infrastructure damage

Note: The above chart displays the current chance for strikes over water, sparsely
populated land, lightly to moderately populated land, and heavily populated land. The
third column displays the casualty and damage potential. A more robust model could
be generated using DoD or DoE models containing population and weather layers.
With the current population explosion, these numbers will increase.
As seen from the above table, although the chances are highest for an
undetected 25-100 m strike within the next few centuries, the chance for the “perfect
storm”, or a strike on a highly populated area, is less than 1%. However, with growing
population, the 29% chance of a strike in a rural area can no longer be arbitrarily
discounted.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Steps to the Method
The following describes the method used to determine the most likely size range
containing the next EI with enough warning time to be actionable. It is also the method
by which warning times for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID around the Earth are
developed in this model. In the process, the success of Spaceguard over the past 14
years is characterized, and the outcome of the next similar size periods is projected.
This database analysis was carried out and then used the conclusions to formulate basic
mission campaigns for the most likely scenarios.
First, the planetary defense problem set was related to layered defense strategies
used in the US military. Discovery and tracking and predictive analysis are the most
crucial and first of the layers in planetary defense, followed by the use of in situ
transponder missions to characterize the PHA and provide refined orbital parameters.
Secondly, the situation of a PHA only detected on its last orbit prior to strike is
examined. Then warning times for entry into the 0.05 AU MOID as a corollary to
actual EI warning times are examined.
The 0.05 AU MOID warning times were derived by compiling all of the times
between first detection and each approach within the 0.05 AU MOID for “known”
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objects. These known objects have been detected already and have orbits which have
been forward and backward projected between 1900-2200, depending upon the
uncertainties in the orbits. Past and recent rates for detection of new objects were
analyzed and forward projected over several decades. Next, an analysis of the typical
percentage of objects that have high uncertainty was accomplished. In this model, they
are considered lost because their future penetrations of 0.05 AU cannot be reliably
predicted past a few years. Following this, estimates for how many approaches within
the MOID are entirely missed in an average 14 year Spaceguard period are made.
These are called “missed approaches.” Many very small objects come fairly close to
the Earth without our knowing it. The number of missed approaches will decrease as
more NEAs are discovered. Finally, all of the above data is compiled into histograms
of 0.05 AU warning times for each size bin.
Layered Planetary Defense
Rather than relying purely on technical means to detect a NEA on its last
approach prior to impact, the “layered” approach to planetary defense provides a more
robust result. This approach to planetary defense falls in line with defense mechanisms
for any physical security found in the military. For example, airbase security might be
divided into layers, with the outer layer stopping the majority of significant attacks,
through information collected on potential threats. If information fails to alert security
forces far enough in advance, the base perimeter might be construed as the next layer of
defense. Following this, an individual building’s security mechanisms, followed by,
for example, security on individual computers or for individual rooms. The most
valuable of the layers is generally the informational layer.
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Figure 4. Example of Layered Defense for Airbase Security.
This analogue is used to design a similar approach to Planetary Defense. Here,
the outer layers encompass information gathering against NEOs, to determine the
general population of objects whose q values are less than 1.3 AU. Next is another
informational layer, the subgroup of NEAs which come within 0.05 AU of the Earth
called PHAs. A third informational layer is radar imaging for refinement of orbits,
when possible. When an object provides a reasonable probability of being an EI,
RADAR imaging is a logical tool for refining the probabilities of impact. One of the
probabilities required is for the likelihood that an object will enter a gravitational
keyhole with Earth, whereby the Earth’s gravity interacts with the PHA such that it has
a significant increase in the likelihood of impact on subsequent approaches. Each
object has its own “personal” keyhole, whose calculations help determine the ultimate
chance of impact (Garretson, personal communication,, December 1, 2011).
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Figure 5. Layered Defense Applied to Planetary Defense.
If, through the first three “informational” layers, an object is determined to have
a reasonable likelihood of striking the Earth, the next layer of defense comes into playthat of finding a very precise orbit and characterization data through a precursor
characterization/transponder mission. This mission, costing less than $300 M, could
save billions of dollars by demonstrating conclusively that a large-scale mitigation
mission is unnecessary. Moreover, if a precursor mission determines that the likelihood
of impact is even higher than originally estimated through ground observation,
deflection attempts are the next layer of defense. A host of deflection mechanisms
have been theorized, to include nuclear, kinetic, and slower mechanisms such as gravity
tractors and propulsion systems. Should deflection attempts prove unsuccessful, the
next layer of defense is evacuation of areas most likely to receive the unwelcome
impactor. If an object is detected a few days or weeks prior to impact, it may be
possible to calculate the likely location of impact to at least attempt evacuation.
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Planetary Defense Only Using Last Approach

Figure 6. Planetary Defense Only Using Last Approach.
This chart from Doomsday Asteroid (1996) shows how typical observations can yield
poor results if warning time is only a function of detection technology on the last pass.
The asteroid is the dotted loop; each dot corresponds to one month of its orbit, so the
dots cover are close together at aphelion, corresponding to higher velocities. (Cox &
Chestek, 1996)
As Cox and Chestek (1996) explain, if we trace back from the impact, we will
see that by only observing during opposition, observation of the EI is only possible
around one, two, or three months before impact, using the midnight direction.
“However, the gray, two-headed arrow shows the direction in which we should have
been looking nine months before impact to see the asteroid” (Cox & Chestek, 1996, p.
98). But this would require a space-based telescope. The double-sided arrow in Figure
6 corresponds to where the Earth and asteroid are at nine months prior to impact.
“Note that an Earth-based telescope would be in daylight, facing the sun (the “O” in the
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diagram), and therefore would be blinded by it.” (Cox & Chestek, 1996, p. 99) If a
spacecraft was positioned several months ahead of the Earth’s orbit, for example, at the
T-4 arrow (corresponding to four months prior to impact) on the chart, it could increase
the warning time for the last pass prior to impact substantially.
This diagram shows how even now, ground-based observations will at best
yield a few months warning time if the EI strikes on the first observed pass.
Fortunately, this is an unlikely phenomenon for large objects, which have mostly been
detected and pose no immediate hazard. However, it is a possible outcome for objects
smaller than 300 m.
Space-based mechanisms could increase the final approach warning times for
EIs by several months. As Cox and Chestek point out, an early warning telescope,
positioned three months ahead of the Earth, could provide six months of warning for a
PHA that would normally provide only two months of warning (Cox & Chestek, 1996,
p. 110). Lindley Johnson, Director of NASA’s Discovery Program Office and NEO
Program, cited the possibility of placing a space-based asset in a Venus orbit looking
out to increase NEO detection success (L. Johnson, personal communication, January
5, 2012). Even a few months more warning time would at the very least allow for
greater trajectory resolution, impact location predictions, and planned evacuations.
Moreover, with the right planning, it might even allow for a crash program for
interception.
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Layered Defense: Using the 0.05 AU MOID
After examining the “detection on last approach” warning time scenario, we
next examined the more manageable (but still difficult) process Spaceguard has
undertaken of finding as many objects as possible, in the hopes of detecting an EI well
before its last approach. This section contains the next step- producing graphical
representations of past and present warning times for asteroids entering the 0.05
Astronomical Unit (AU) Minimum Orbit Intersection Distance (MOID) of Earth. This
MOID is a spherical region, similar to that of the Earth’s surface. (Note: It may be
possible to obtain more precise estimates by using a portion of the MOID, close to the
ecliptic, due to the fact that objects with higher inclination may be less apt to strike the
Earth (M. Gaffey, personal communication, 20 Apr 2012).
Penetration of this spherical MOID around the Earth should be viewed as a
critical event. Warning time to this critical event is in some ways analogous to warning
times for impact with the Earth. However, because the body does not actually strike
the Earth, this warning time should be considered the amount of time available for a
decision to be made- whether to focus more observational assets on the body, send a
precursor to it, or other orbital refinement techniques.
For this part of the analysis, data for 7,300 predicted and past close approaches
within the 0.05 AU MOID were combined with the dates of first discovery of these
asteroids. The source data came from NASA’s NEO Program database of close
approaches (NASA NEO- Program, 2011), JPL’s Small Body Database (NASA JPL,
2011), and the International Astronomical Union Minor Planet Center (IAU MPC,
2011). The dates of discovery were then subtracted from the dates of close approach
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for each penetration of the MOID. The main spreadsheet was then divided into
separate bins by size, and the results graphed. Figure 7 illustrates the concept:

Figure 7. Visualization of 0.05 AU Approach Warning Time.
The offending NEA is in the upper left-hand corner. Subtracting the date of discovery
from the date of close approach provides the warning time for this approach. While not
an exact analogue to EI warning time, it gives us a defined period of time for decided
action or inaction.
Data Sources for NEA Warning Time Analysis
Downloaded data included all approaches for NEAs projected to fly within 0.05
AUs of Earth between 1900 and 2200. The initial data came from NASA’s NEO-P
website, which gives options for downloading NEA data for different H magnitudes,
distances from Earth, and timeframes. NEOs that enter within 0.05 AU were chosen
because of the standard international definition of PHAs. Also, the size of the database
for 0.05 AU penetrations, while large, is possible to work with using Microsoft Excel.
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Although objects smaller than 150 m are not defined as PHAs, data were utilized for all
sizes of NEAs, to include those below 150 m.
Size-Albedo-Absolute Magnitude Relationship
After bringing data for all PHAs into our Microsoft Excel database (to include
those objects smaller than 150 m), conversion of the absolute magnitude to an
estimated diameter for the objects was carried out. Absolute magnitude is defined as
the “visual magnitude an observer would record if the asteroid were placed one AU
away, and one AU from the Sun and at a zero phase angle (NEO-P, 2012) The
standard conversion formula was used, relating absolute magnitude (H), albedo (p), and
the diameter of an assumed homogeneous spherical object, as used by NASA JPL
(Chesley S. C., 2002, p. 425):
Equation 1
Relationship of albedo, absolute magnitude, and diameter
𝐷=

1329
√𝑝

10−0.2𝐻

The relationship between the diameter and magnitude are an approximation.
Bowell et al. explains, “the principal source of error in the size of the object generally
arises from the albedo uncertainty. However, the computed value of H can easily be
wrong by a half magnitude or more since several simplifying assumptions are made
about the object’s phase relation” (as cited in Chesley, 2002, p. 3). NEOWISE has
demonstrated that in the infrared part of the spectrum, NEOs which appear very small
visually may actually be very large objects with low reflectivity (albedo). Objects with
very high reflectivity may, in contrast, be estimated as larger than they actually are.
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We may see, with visual observation, only the tip of the ice berg. Figure 8 from
NEOWISE illustrates the difference between visible light and infrared light emitted by
a set of NEOs.

Figure 8. Visible versus IR Asteroid Size.
Here we see that a dark object such as charcoal would, in visible light, look the same
size as a much smaller chalk object. However, in the IR, charcoal radiates much more
heat, giving it a signature comparable to its size. (NASA/JPL-Caltech, 2011)
H value is inversely related to size, all other things being constant (equal
albedos). For objects of equal albedo, high H values correspond to small objects, and
low H Values correspond to larger objects. The issue is that albedos for NEAs are far
from equal and are estimated to cluster around 0.05 and 0.25 (NASA NEO-P website,
2012). Average albedos used on NASA’s NEO-P website previously assumed a mean
albedo for NEAs of 0.11, which meant that a corresponding H value for a one km NEA
was H= 18.0. According to NASA’s Planetary Science Division Program Executive,
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the database was changed in recent years to reflect an updated estimate for average
albedo to .14 for NEAs, carried out by J.S. Stuart in 2003 (L. Johnson, personal
communication, January 5, 2012). Using equation 1, this establishes an absolute
magnitude of 17.75 +/-.1 for diameters of 1 km, vice the previously used H = 18.0.
This means, essentially, that NEOs may be slightly smaller on average than previously
understood. However, the type of asteroid is important when looking at albedos. A
more comprehensive method for accomplishing warning time estimates might look at
the population of types of asteroids, using average albedos for each type, rather than for
the entire population.
With the average albedo of 0.14 and H values from the NEO-P database,
equation 1 was used to populate the spreadsheet with estimated sizes of our objects
(NEO-P, 2012). Objects were then separated out into the size bins of >1 km, 500- 1000
m, 300-500 m, 100-300 m, 25-100 m, and <25 m.
Inserting Dates of First Observation
Next, data with the following parameters were downloaded from the JPL Small
Body Database Engine into a separate workbook: full name, primary designation, first
observation date, last observation date, magnitude (H), and MOID (AU) (NASA JPL,
2011). The full name and primary designation were both included to make sure the two
databases matched accurately. First observation date is the date when the PHA is first
discovered. Last observation date was not used for this analysis; however, it was
downloaded along with several related data elements for potential future work on the
relationship between observation arc length and uncertainties. The MOID data was the
distance from a MOID around the Earth; all objects whose MOID was less than 0.05
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AU were downloaded. Manually combining the Small Body Database data with the
NEO-P data to produce a single database took several weeks due to the differences in
the way the data is arranged. The resulting single database contained the name of the
object, its primary designation, its magnitude, the date of first observation for each
object and the date for each approach within 0.05 AU.
Detection-to-Approach Times for Known Objects
Using the combined database, the dates of first known observation and closest
known approach dates were converted to a format suitable in Excel for subtraction.
The next step was the subtraction of dates of first observation from the approach dates,
and conversion of this to a time value. This difference, whether negative or positive,
represents the warning time for each close approach. These objects are called known
objects, and their corresponding approaches are called known approaches, because they
have been discovered.
Table 3. Subset of the 7,300 Close Approaches with Warning Times.

Note: Table 3 portrays four approach events, but only two NEAs. NEA 2003 RB was
discovered in February of 2002 and has a calculated close approach 68.58 years later in 2070.
NEA 2002 CU11 has three close approaches shown in the table. The event in 1983 had a
negative warning time, meaning the object was only observed 18.45 years after that close
approach event. In 2014, however, 2002 CU11 has a close approach event with 12.57 years of
warning time, within which a decision for further observation or greater action could be made.
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Subtraction of the dates of discovery for the 7300 close approaches from

their dates for close approach within the .05 AU MOID was then accomplished.

The following is an example of four approach events from that combined spreadsheet
of 7,300 events; the electronic version of the full spreadsheet is available on request:

Figure 9. Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (D>1000m).
We can see from this figure that for objects with H values less than 17.75, corresponding
roughly to diameters greater than 1 km, the warning times for known approaches between
1984-1997 were most often less than 1 year, with several objects detected only years after they
passed by. In the second period, all approaches were known about prior to penetration in this
size range.

There is a slight shift to the right in these warning times, which is to be
expected due to better technology. NEA detection is not static; the technology has
increased dramatically, and the focus on the problem set has as well. Because
technology has increased and resources have been allocated towards the NEO problem
set, the warning times appear to have increased between the two periods. In effect, the
above graph measures some of the effect of improved technology on warning times.
However, this chart (and the next three), do not contain estimates for missed
approaches or high uncertainty trajectory objects. That will follow in Chapter III,
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Results, which compiles the above data with missed approaches, trajectory
uncertainties, and the projection of future discovery rates.
Objects in the other size ranges all show the same trend towards greater warning
time, due to the increased efforts and technology of Spaceguard. The following figure
displays the change in 0.05 AU warning times for the diameter range 500-1000 m:

Figure 10. Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (500 < D< 1000m).
As expected, warning times for known objects in this size range increased from one period to the next.
The bulk of the objects in the first period (1984-1997, in blue) had negative warning times, prior to the
congressional mandate. Average warning times for these mid-sized objects increased in the next period,
in blue, with 13 objects approaching within the 0.05 AU MOID between 0 and 2 years after initial
detection.

While the graph below gives the appearance of dramatic improvement, without
incorporating missed approaches and uncertainties, it is just a building block.
The size bin between 100 and 300 m has a more apparent increase in both
number of objects discovered and in warning times for these objects. Prior to the
Spaceguard period, objects in this size range were not often detected. From 1998-2011,
detection rates in this size bin increased dramatically. Warning times shifted to the
right, but still measured only in days. In other words, most of these objects were
discovered either a few days before or after their close approach since 1998. This
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shows the effect that Spaceguard had.
The chart for ~300-500 m objects follows. Again, there is the expected increase
in warning times for known objects.

Figure 11. Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (~300 < D< 500m).
This figure shows that from 1984-1997, over 20 approaches had negative warning
times. In other words, the objects were detected over two years after their approaches.
In 1998-2011, however, with increased technology, there dramatic improvement; most
known approaches happened between 0 and 1 year after object discovery. Also visible
is a dramatic increase in discovery rates.
Here is the histogram for 100-300 m close approaches:

Figure 12. Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (~100 < D< 300 m).
Most observed objects in this size range were discovered either a few days before or
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after their 0.05 AU penetration. Later we will see that many objects in this size range
are also missed completely.
Finally, here is the chart for objects from 25-100 m in diameter:

Figure 13. Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (~25 < D< 100 m).
Object discoveries and approach warning times increased dramatically for very small
objects. From 1997-2011 (red), most approaches happened between 5 days before and
10 days after discover. Missed approaches, graphed later, will significantly change the
distribution of warning times shown above.
The above charts who how far in advance NASA was able to predict close
approaches for discovered objects in the 14 years after 1998 as compared to the 14
years prior to 1998. However, these graphs do not account for the PHAs that passed
within 0.05 AU without being detected; these objects are referred to as “Missed
objects” in this paper. Nor do these graphs account for objects whose orbital
uncertainties are very high. In later sections, this is attempted. First, detection rates,
the next step for making projections of future warning times for 0.05 AU penetrations,
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are examined.
Detection Rates for New Objects
Counting detection rates over the last Spaceguard period and extrapolating these
out over several more such periods will give us an estimate for future discoveries,
based on current technology. Because there are upper limits to the number of objects in
each size range, it is possible to estimate when most of the objects will be detected. As
more objects are detected, the likelihood of finding an undetected object goes down.
Since the majority of large objects have been found, detection rates have declined.
Detection rates for very small objects, however, have experienced marked increases,
because the number of these objects is so vast that it will be decades to centuries before
they are all detected.
The following is a spreadsheet showing the detection rates counted from the
same NEO-P dataset downloaded at the end of 2011 (NASA NEO- Program, 2011).
Size bins again match those used by NEOWISE for consistency. An important
distinction here is that this table displays detection rates for PHAs, as opposed to close
approaches. One PHA can have several close approaches over the period 1900-2200.
Table 4. Number of PHAs Detected from 1998-2011 by Year.
>1km
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

4
4
7
3
9
2
5
6

500m1km
13
5
15
20
24
11
14
11

301m500m
9
9
16
16
22
16
12
19
45

100m300m
21
14
28
30
39
30
40
43

25m100m
8
14
27
41
51
48
99
100

<25m

<100m

4
2
2
7
12
22
33
51

12
16
29
48
63
70
132
151

2006
2007
Table 4. Cont.

2008
2009
2010
2011
Total

0
1

7
8

15
15

23
37

101
119

60
61

161
180

>1km

500m1km
6
5
3
5
147

301m500m
18
9
11
11
198

100m300m
46
44
39
36
470

25m100m
138
140
135
117
1138

<25m

<100m

84
117
140
116
711

222
257
275
233
1849

2
0
1
0
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Note: This table shows the number of PHAs detected each year for the combined
Spaceguard effort from 1998-2011. An upward trend for discovery of very small
objects is visible. This is likely due to technology increases. Also visible is a
downward trend for large object discovery, as the population nears completion. Source
data from NASAs Close Approach database. (NASA NEO-Program, 2011)
Table 5. Estimated PHAs Still Undetected.
Determining # PHAs left to
detect:
1. Estimated Total NEAs

>1km
981*

500m1km
1500*

301m500m
2400*

25m100m
50,000- 1 M**

1100*

100m300m
15,700
*
2000*

2. NEAs Detected to date

912*

1200*

3. % NEAs detected as of
Dec 2011
4. PHAs counted in
database***
5. Total PHAs expected

93%

80%

46%

13%

.3%- 6%

116

204

219

485

1166

125

255

478

3,807

19,433-389,000

3000*

6. PHAs left to detect++
9
51
259
3,322 18,267-387,800
*
from NEOWISE graphic
** from NASA NEO Science Definition Team graphic; significant uncertainty in this
size range
*** From the NEO-P dataset downloaded at the end of 2011.
+
Divide row 4 by row 3.
++ For completion (subtract row 4 from row 5)
Note: This table lists the estimated total NEAs from the NEOWISE graphic and from the
NASA NEO Science Definition Team graphic. Below this, it lists the number of NEOs
detected so far, and the percent completion of the population. Following this is the number of
PHAs counted in the database downloaded at the end of 2011. These numbers change as more
NEOs and PHAs are discovered, so a cut-off point for the study was the end of 2011. Based on
the total NEOs and percentage of NEOs discovered, we estimate the number of PHAs that will
be in the database when it eventually reaches completion, for each size bin. The final row is an
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estimate for the number of PHAs left to detect for each size bin. The largest uncertainties will
be found in the very small PHAs.

For the large bodies (over 500 m), detection of the last objects appears to have
leveled out.
Discovery of objects over 1000 m is declining steadily as the population of
objects left undiscovered decreases. Any number of projections could be used to
estimate how many future discoveries may take place. A best fit curve yielded 1.88
discoveries per year for objects over 1000 m and 3.66 per year for objects between 500
and 1000 m, but almost any curve could be chosen. A range between 0 and 3
discoveries per year for objects over 1000 m, and for objects from 500-1000 m,
between 2 and 5 objects per year, appears to be fairly normal in recent years.
Very small bodies (< 100m) are much more difficult to find and track. They
also have much larger populations and increasing detection rates. For these bodies, we
used a simple average of the detection rates from 2004, one of the early years of the
Catalina Sky Survey, to 2011. According to Dr. Timothy Spahr, head of the Minor
Planet Center, detection of smaller objects has increased dramatically due to the
Catalina Sky Survey (T. Spahr, personal communication, Feb 2, 2012). Without
reliable statistics on newer technologies, we use Catalina Sky Survey detection rates as
our base. When better technologies come on line, this study could be updated to reflect
faster detection rates. For PHAs 100-500m, we also used a simple average for the
2004-2011 period. Our resulting projected detection totals are shown in table 6.
Table 6 does not take into account the high uncertainty in the orbits of small
object, which are a complicating factor and are addressed in the next section. It appears
that within two more 14-year periods, all objects greater than 300 m will have been
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discovered and tracked; moreover, it appears that objects in the 100-300 m range might
all be detected sometime in the 22nd century. However, it may take longer than this
because of the high uncertainty in many of the trajectories for objects under 300 m. For
objects under 100 m, even without including trajectory uncertainties, it will be 164
years before a full catalog is possible, unless significant technological improvements
take place. And once trajectory uncertainties are incorporated, the time it takes for
completion will grow considerably for smaller objects.
Table 6. Estimated Objects Detected by the End of Future Period, Excluding Loss
Rates.

PHAs left to detect

>1km
9

500m1km
51

301500m
258.8

100-300m
3322.2

25-100m
19,433389,000
~120

Average new objects
~1-3
~2-5
~14
~39
per year (2004-2011)
Yrs from now until all
3-9 yrs 10-26 yrs ~19 yrs.
~86 yrs*
~164objects detected with 0
over
loss rates*
3,000*
Detected 2012- 2025
9**
47**
192.5
539
1661
* Higher uncertainty rates for the small bodies would cause many of the very
small bodies to be lost, increasing the time for completion.
** Calculated using best fit curve; all others are calculated using averages
Note: The first row of this table (from the preceding table), and is an estimate of the
number of PHAs left to detect in each size range. The second row is an estimate for the
average number of detections per year into the future, given no significant
technological changes. The third row estimates how many years it will take for
completion, excluding loss rates. The fourth row contains the estimated number of
objects detected in the next Spaceguard period.
Level 2 PHAs: High Orbital Uncertainties
We next estimated the number of Level 2 PHAs in our database- those PHAs
whose orbital trajectories have such high uncertainties that they cannot be reliably
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projected far enough into the future to provide substantive warning times. The more
Level 2 PHAs there are, the longer it will take for completion of the population.
Dr. Amy Mainzer, who runs NASA’s NEOWISE program at JPL, pointed out
that although many NEAs are “discovered”, the astrometric uncertainties are often so
large that an astronomer might have difficulty finding the object. (A. Mainzer, personal
communication, October 6, 2011). For small objects, there are several barriers that
prevent high certainty trajectory predictions. One of these is the great difficulty finding
and observing for extended arc lengths over more than one opposition, bodies that are
faint. Small objects, “typically have much weaker orbits that only allow prediction
intervals of a few decades or less” (S. Chesley, personal communication, January 29,
2012).
Moreover, according to Dr. Paul Chodas, the source of these uncertainties is in
the radial distance of the object from the Earth for NEAs with short observations arcs
(only observed for a short period of time). A radial distance of a few thousand km will
“map into an uncertainty in the heliocentric semi-major axis, which over time maps into
a large uncertainty along the orbit path of the object. When this uncertainty becomes
too large, we can’t be certain that a predicted close approach will occur at all, since the
object could be anywhere within a large region” (P. Chodas, personal communication,
January 30, 2012). As an example of such uncertainty, McMillan notes that “ PHA
2003 BK47 was discovered by Spacewatch at V = 21.8 and pounded (sic) with 50
observations spanning more than a month, yet the uncertainty of its ephemeris at its
next favorable apparition in 2011 will be 2-3 degrees” (McMillan, 2009, p. p. 3). If the
uncertainty is too high, over time, the object can be effectively lost.
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Additionally, non-gravitational forces affect small bodies over centuries in ways
which are not all very well modeled. According to Lindley Johnson and the NASA JPL
website, JPL considers the eight major planets, Earth and Moon separately, Ceres,
Vesta, and Pallas when calculating orbits of NEAs, just as the Minor Planet Center
website does (NASA JPL, 2011). All major gravitational perturbations, therefore, are
accounted for, and except for very small objects, the orbits of PHAs are predictable if
enough observations are made.
For very small objects, however, could non-gravitational forces have enough
effect on PHAs to require their re-detection years later? Could such non-gravitational
forces delay completion of the population by modifying the orbits of small objects such
that they are eventually lost? According to Dr. Steven Chesley, NASA JPL, the
Yarkovsky affect increases as the inverse of the asteroid diameter and causes orbital
trajectory deviations on the order of 10-20 km in 500m objects over the course of a
decade. (S. Chesley, personal communication, Nov 14, 2011). Allouis et al. (2007)
state that, “The Yarkowski (sic) Effect alone can shift the position of Apophis by over
100 km between 2017 and 2029, which means it cannot be ignored in the orbit
propagation models (EADS Astrium, 2007, p. iv). Apophis has a diameter of
approximately 270 m. Over the course of 5,000 years, an object in the Apophis size
range could, therefore, have its trajectory modified by over 50,000 km, or four Earth
diameters. For objects under 100 m range, such 50,000 km orbital deviations could
take place in a few hundred years, prior to completion of the survey of these very small
objects.

50

Over the course of the time it would take to discover all objects under 100 m in
diameter, therefore, non-gravitational effects might necessitate their rediscovery, if the
Spaceguard program does not have consistent funding and continued application over
the course of several decades to centuries.
To approximate the percentage of high uncertainty objects (Level 2 PHAs), a
compilation of the number of close approaches in each Spaceguard period over the
course of 300 years (from 1900-2200) was completed.
Table 7. 0.05 AU Approaches Detected and Back-/Forward- Calculated, 1900-2200.
>1km

500m1km
35

301m500m
34

100m300m
59

25m100m
57

<25m

1914- 1927

17

1928- 1941

12

40

39

77

68

30

1942- 1955

17

35

46

72

92

45

1956- 1969

22

29

39

66

87

57

1970- 1983

10

34

32

76

71

64

1984- 1997

19

41

33

69

92

60

1998- 2011

19

37

75

328

1166

804

2012- 2025

15

32

49

96

68

48

2026- 2039

9

37

42

68

90

46

2040- 2053

12

41

41

79

90

70

2054- 2067

17

33

36

78

90

59

2068- 2081

21

36

36

78

79

38

2082- 2095

18

27

43

58

77

29

2096- 2109

14

42

44

81

53

20

2110- 2123

19

29

35

63

42

17

2124- 2137

19

40

39

62

39

19

2138- 2151

12

32

40

59

39

13

2152- 2165

6

34

38

53

34

7

2166- 2179

11

36

43

43

33

7

2180- 2193
2194- 2200 (only 6 yrs.)

14
12

23
17

28
18

42
18

23
18

6
4

315

710

830

1625

2408

1464

Total (20.428spacegaurd periods)
Average per period

15.42

34.76

40.63

79.55

117.88

Standard Deviation

4.33

5.04

9.54

59.75

247

21

71.67
173

Note: Note that for bodies larger than 500 m, the approaches in all periods are close to the mean.
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However, for bodies smaller than 500 m, there are a significantly greater number of approaches in the
1998-2011 period than in the periods after and before it. This means that many of the small objects
discovered between 1998 and 2011 had uncertainties too high to forward and backward project their
close approaches for more than a few years. If the uncertainties were lower, one would see a fairly
constant rate of close approaches, as is the case for the larger bodies.

Figure 14. 00.05 AU Close Approach Trends 1900-2200.
Note that for large bodies (blue), the number of approaches is fairly. Bodies under 500
m, seemingly have a higher number of close approaches in the 1998-2011 period. This
peak gives us an estimate for the percent of approaching bodies with high trajectory
uncertainty. If all objects were detected had well-known orbits, the peaks would be the
norm.
Level 1 PHAs discovered from 1998-2011 should have highly refined orbital
trajectories, which have been projected forward to 2200 and back to 1900. If all PHAs
have Level 1 trajectories (high certainty), the number of approaches should be
consistent throughout 1900-2200. This is the case for large bodies, which have high
trajectory certainties, because JPL can project all approaches back to 1900 and forward
to 2200. However, small bodies, with high uncertainties, show a significant increase in
close approaches between 1998-2012, with a sharp decline in the following periods.
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This is because, due to uncertainty, the approaches for these small objects could only be
projected a few years out. By measuring the percentage decline from the peak, we can
get an idea for the percentage of objects with trajectory uncertainties too high to map
out to future periods. This provides us the percent of Level 2 PHAs in the observed
population.
Approaches in the >1000 m bin and 500-1000 m bin have no significant peak.
All values for those size bins are within 2.1 standard deviations from the mean.
However the peaks for the 300-500 m and 100-300 m bins are larger than three
standard deviations from the mean. The peak for the 25-100 m size bin, not depicted
above, is 1166, similarly over 3 standard deviations from the mean.
The next table displays the method used for and results of calculating the percent of
objects with Level 2 trajectories- that is, trajectories which cannot be projected out
more than another Spaceguard period, or 14 years. Level 1 trajectories can are well
defined between 1900-2200 and beyond. The first rows of table 8 originate from the
preceding table (as displayed in figure 17):
Table 8. Estimated Percentage of Level 2 PHAs (high uncertainty) for 0.05 AU
Penetrations.
Estimated Diameter Range
H Value

301- 500m
20.3-19.3

100- 300m
22.7-20.4

25- 100m
25.7-22.8

<25m
>25.7

1. Average approaches per 14 yr period
2. Average w/o peak
3. Peak

40.6
38.9
75

79.5
66.8
328

117.9
63.9
1166

71.7
34.0
804

4. Level 2 PHAs in Spaceguard period.
5. Estimated Percent Level 2 PHAs in
period

36.1
48.2%

261.2
79.7%

1102
94.5%

770
95.8%

Note: This table estimates the number of PHAs in a period that are not observed long enough to
have Level 1 (highly certain) trajectories. The first row gives the estimated H value for that
size range. Item “1”, is the average of all of the approaches in the preceding table. “2” is the
average when the peak from the 1998-2011 time period is deleted. Item 3 is the peak value.
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Item 4 subtracts the average “2” from the peak value “3”. Item 5 comes from dividing item 4
from item 3; this is the percent PHAs with high uncertainties. In our model, these are
essentially “lost” for warning time purposes because they do not have reliable orbital
projections.

Another method by which average uncertainty rates could be calculated might
be to perform a count within the Minor Planet Center or JPL Small Body Database
Browser of how many objects in various size bins have been observed at more than 1
opposition or for some minimum arc length for high certainty. Using another method
might provide another means to calculate the loss rates for veracity. In any case, the
rates in the last row for Level 2 PHAs will be incorporated into our model later on, after
another part that cannot be left out is addressed- missed approaches.
Estimating Missed Approaches
Our next step was to model a simple estimate of missed approaches to add to
our overall model. Missed objects, and their corresponding missed approaches, are
important because they are objects that have flown into and out of the 0.05 AU MOID
without detection. The objects might have been simply missed due to lack of coverage
or technology to see all very small objects, or they might be undetectable because the
objects might, for example, “spend all their time interior to the Earth’s orbit and are
therefore detectable only at solar elongations of less than 90°” (Grav, 2011, p. 425). In
our model, missed approaches are added in, with warning times of 0.
An iterative process captured in the next 5 tables and described below was used
to calculate the number of missed approaches out to the Spaceguard period ending in
2067. The number of known approaches was subtracted from the total estimated
approaches over the 300 year period (1900-2200) for each size bin and then dividing
this by the number of periods to determine the average # of missed approaches per
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period. This simplistic approach may provide some estimates. Monte Carlo Simulation
could be used for an in depth project to estimate missed approaches.
Equation 2
𝐴𝑚 = 𝐴𝑇 − 𝐴𝐾

Where Am is the estimated number of missed approaches from 1900-2200, AT is the
estimated total number of approaches from 1900-2200, and AK is the number of known
approaches from 1900-2200. Known approaches do not constitute all approaches.
Objects which have not yet been detected may penetrate the .05 AU MOID. These
“missed approaches” are the total approaches minus the known approaches. The error
in this estimate will be comparable to the error in the total estimated approaches.
Next this is divided by the number of 14 year periods within our data period of 19002200, which is 20.4, to determine the average # of missed approaches per period.
Equation 3
����
Am 𝑆𝑆 =

Am
20.43

Where ����
Am 𝑆𝑆 is the average number of missed approaches per Spaceguard period and

20.43 is the number of Spaceguard periods within the 1900-2200 time period.

In order to find this, AT must first be estimated. AK, the number of known approaches
from 1900-2200, comes from our database pull from the NEO-P website (NASA NEOProgram, 2011). To calculate AT (the total estimated approaches), the number of
known approaches was divided by the percentage objects that have been detected to
date. The assumption is that the total number of approaches is proportional to the total
objects:
Equation 4
𝐴𝑇 =

𝐴𝐾
𝑃𝑑

Where Pd is the percentage of objects detected. Equation 4 is based on the following
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logic: If we know the percentage of 500-1000 m diameter objects that have been
discovered (Pd =80%), and the number of approaches corresponding to these known
objects (AK = 710), the remaining 20% of undiscovered objects add a proportional

number of approaches. Therefore by dividing the known approaches by the percent of
objects discovered, an estimate for the total approaches is made at AT = 710/.8= 888

approaches. The missed approaches Am are then the total (888) minus the known

(710), or 178 missed penetrations of the MOID. This method has error proportional to
the error in the percentage of undiscovered objects. More confidence in the results
could come if some form of Monte Carlo simulations could yield better estimates for
the total numbers of PHA approaches.
Compiling the Data
These simple equations and additional ones discussed after the next table, which
contains an iterative process beginning with the compilation from the previous
population tables for the following spreadsheet. The goal of this process is to project
future detection rates, missed approaches, and level 2 PHAs (high uncertainty). Table
10 contains the initial steps of this process.
Using equation 2, the number of missed approaches is the total number of
approaches minus the number of known approaches, or 710 for 500-1000 m PHAs.
This gives us the missed approaches for 1900-2200, or 178. These are divided by 20.4,
the number of Spaceguard periods in 300 years, to get an expected number of missed
approaches of 8.69 per period. So in each 14 year period a 500-1000 m object may
penetrate the 0.05 AU MOID 9 times without our knowing about it. These missed
penetrations, receive a warning time value of less than or equal to 0.
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Table 9. Estimated Missed 0.05 AU MOID Approaches 1998-2011.
1998-2011
Given
a. Total estimated PHAs
b. Total PHAs by 2011
(table 5)
c. PHA detections (table 4)
d. % objects detected by 2011
(table 5)
e. Known Approaches
1900-2200 (table 7)
f. % Level 2 PHAs- highly
uncertain trajectories
(table 8)
Calculate:
1. Total approaches
1900-2200 (equation 5)
2. Missed approaches
1900-2200 (equation 2)
3. Missed approaches per
period (equation 3)
4. Expected # Level 2 PHAs
this period
(= row c* row f)

>1km

500m-1km

301-500m

100-300m

25-100m

125

255

478

3807

116

204

219

485

19,433389,000
1,166

44
93%

147
80%

198
46%

470
13%

1138
.3%- 6%

315

710

830

1625

2,408

0

0

48.2%

79.7%

94.5%

339

888

1,811

12,756

~24

~178

~981

~11,131

~1

~9

~48

~545

0

0

~95

~374

~40,000>750,000
~38,000>748,000
~2,00037,000
~1,076

Note: This table contains 5 rows of data from previous parts of our discussion. These data are
first used to calculate the total estimated approaches by dividing the known approaches (e) by
the % of objects detected (c). Missed approaches are derived by subtracting the known
approaches (e) from the total (1). The expected missed approaches per period is equal to the
total missed approaches (1900-2200) divided the # of Spaceguard periods, or 20.4. Finally, the
expected number of PHAs with high uncertainty (Level 2), is calculated by multiplying the
percent of level 2 PHAs by the discovered PHAs in the period.

The next table reflects the first to attempt to project the number of PHA
detections, approaches, missed approaches, level 1 PHAs (high certainty trajectories),
level 2 PHAs (highly uncertain trajectories) into the next Spaceguard period, which
ends in 2025. Coincidentally, this is also the year that President Obama has declared as
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the year by which we should send a human to an asteroid.

Tables 10 through 13 result in several values that are used in the graphs in the
following section. This includes the missed approaches, new known approaches, and
level 2 PHAs. The following is a breakdown of how each of these elements was
calculated.
Table 10. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 20122025.
2012-2025 Projection
>1km 500m-1km 301-500m 100-300m
25-100m
Given:
a. Total estimated PHAs
125
255
478
3807
19,433(table 5)
389,000
b. Total estimated Approaches
339
888
1,811
12,756
~40,0001900-2200 (table 9 #1)
>750,000
c. Projected PHA detections
8
47
193
539
1,661
2012-2025 (table 6)
d. Expected # Level 2 PHAs,
0
0
95.41
374.34
1075.61
previous period (table 9)
e. % Level 2 PHAs (table 8)
0
0
48.2%
79.7%
94.5%
f. PHAs detected by 2011
116
204
219
485
1,166
(table 9)
Calculate:
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2025
124
251
316
650
1,751
= row f –row d + row c
1b. Approaches to Object ratio
2.72
3.48
3.79
3.35
2.07
= row b / row a
1c. Approaches per period for
1
8
36
89
168
new PHA detections
= row c * row 1b /20.4
2. % PHAs detected to Level 1
99.4%
98%
66%
17%
9%
by 2025 = row1 / row a
3. Missed approaches
2
14
613
10,580
36,0001900-2200
748,000
=(100%- row 2)* row b
4. Missed approaches this
.1
.68
30
518
1,788
period = row3/20.4
5. Level 2 PHAs this period*
0
0
95.41
374.34
1,075.61
= row c * row e
* For example, for 301-500 m bin, of 193 projected detections, 48% have highly uncertain
trajectories = 95.41 lost objects for that period. See section referencing loss rates for an explanation
of that rate.
Note: By 2025, almost all PHAs over 500 m will be found. 66% of PHAs over 300 m will be found, but
for smaller objects, from 100-300 m and 25-100 m, only a small percentage will have been found. The
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discussion following describes each calculation in the table.

1. Total Level 1 PHAs by 2025. This is the total number of PHAs with high
certainties to their trajectories that we expect will be discovered by 2025. This is equal
to the PHAs detected by the end of the previous period (2011) plus the new PHAs
detected in the current period (2012-2025) minus the level 2 PHAs from the previous
period (whose orbital uncertainty only allows up to 1 period of projection forward) or:
Equation 5
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿1𝑓 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿1𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿2𝑓

Where PHAL1f is the number of level 1 PHAs known by the end of the period, PHAL1i is
the number of level 1 PHAs known at the beginning of the period, PHAd is the number
of PHAs detected in the period, and PHAL2f is the number of level 2 PHAs known by
the beginning of the period.
1b. Approaches to Object Ratio. Every object penetrates the .05 AU MOID
several times over the course of 300 years. The ratio of the number of penetrations to
the number of objects from 1900-2200 is our approach to object ratio:
Equation 6
𝑅𝐴�

𝑃𝑃𝑃

Where R A�

PHA

=

𝐴𝑇
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇

is the ratio of approaches to PHAs, and PHAT is the total estimated

number of known PHAs.

1c. Approaches per period for newly discovered PHAs. For each new object
discovered, there are several new known .05 AU penetrations spread out over 19002200. Averaging this out to find the number of newly added approaches to the model
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follows:

Equation 7
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑 × 𝑅𝐴�

𝑃𝑃𝑃

÷ 20.43

Where ASGn is the number of approaches per Spaceguard period for newly

detected PHAs.

2. Percentage Level 1 PHAs detected by period end. This is the percentage of
PHAs detected by the end of the period with enough orbital certainty to project their
trajectories for the whole period 1900-2200. It is given by dividing the total level 1
PHAs known by the end of the period by the estimated total number of PHAs:
Equation 8
%𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿1𝑓 =

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿1𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇

3. Missed approaches 1900-2200. As previously mentioned, the number of
missed approaches changes with each new period; every time a new PHA is discovered
and its orbit projected, its approaches become known. Approaches missed from the
database are determined by multiplying the percentage undetected PHAs by the total
estimated approaches calculated in equation 5. So the number of missed approaches in
each new period will change as more objects are discovered.
Equation 9
𝐴𝑚,𝑓 = �1 − %𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿1𝑓 � × 𝐴𝑇
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4. Missed approaches this period. This approximately equals the updated total
missed approaches divided by the number of 14 year periods and is represented by the
variable ����
Am 𝑆𝑆,𝑓 . The number of missed approaches in a particular period is unknown;
only the average across all periods can be used.

Equation 10
����
Am 𝑆𝑆,𝑓 =

Am
20.43

5. Level 2 PHAs this period. This is the number of PHAs discovered whose
orbital trajectories cannot be predicted out past 14 years. This is calculated by
multiplying the projected PHA detections in this period by the estimated percentage of
level 2 PHAs calculated earlier (in table 8). The percentage of level 2 (high
uncertainty) PHAs should remain fairly constant until new observing technology and/or
improved observing methods are introduced. Projections in this paper are based only
on current observing technology and techniques. The equation for Level 2 PHAs is:
Equation 11
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿2𝑓 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑 × %𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿2𝑓

Where PHAL2f is the number of number of level 2 PHAs known by the end of

the period, PHAd is the number of PHAs detected in the period, and %PHAL2f is the

estimated percentage of PHAs detected in the period with low certainty orbits.

The following three tables show the results of iterating these equations over the
next three Spaceguard periods..
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Table 11. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 20262039.
2026-2039 Projection
Given:
a. Total estimated PHAs

>1km

500m-1km

301-500m

100-300m

25-100m

125

255

478

3807

b. Total estimated
Approaches
1900-2200
(table 9 #1)
c. Projected PHA
detections this period
(table 5)
d. Expected # Level 2
PHAs, previous period
(table 10)
e. % Level 2 PHAs
(table 8)
f. PHAs detected by
2025 (table 10)
Calculate:
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2039
= row f – row d + row c
1b. Approaches to Object
ratio
1c. Approaches per
period for new PHA
detections
= row c * row1b/20.4
2. % PHAs detected to
Level 1 by 2039
= row 1 /row a
3. Missed approaches
1900-2200
= (100%- row 2) *
row b
4. Missed approaches
this period
(=row 3/20.4)
5. Level 2 PHAs this
Period = row c * row e

339

888

1,811

12,756

19,433389,000
40,000750,000

0

4

193

539

1,661

0

0

95.41

374.34

1,075.61

0

0

48.2%

79.7%

94.5%

116

204

219

485

1,166

124

255

416

759

1842

2.72

3.48

3.79

3.35

2.07

0

1

36

89

168

99.4%

99%

87%

20%

9%

2

9

235

10,212

36,000750000

.1

.43

12

500

1,779

0

0

93

429

1,570

Note: As seen from comparing item 1 to item a, by 2039, virtually all objects over 500 m have been
found and objects from 300-500 m are nearing completion. But objects from 100- 300 m still have
decades before completion. With this level of completion, large objects will still have on average two
undetected penetrations of the MOID (item 3) in the three hundred year period, with approximately .1
missed approaches (item 4) in the period. Small objects will be missed frequently, with 500 missed
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penetrations (item 4) of 100-300 m objects through the MOID in the period. Within the same size range,
about 429 PHAs (item 5) will have very high uncertainties to their trajectories, so they will not provide
reliable orbital projections.

Table 12. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 20402053
2040-2053 Projection
Given:
a. Total estimated PHAs

>1km

500m-1km

301-500m

100-300m

25-100m

125

255

478

3807

19,433389,000
40,000750,000

b. Total estimated
339
888
1,811
12,756
Approaches 1900-2200
(table 9 #1)
c. Projected PHA
0
0
62
539
1,661
detections this period
(table 5)
d. Expected # Level 2
0
0
93
429
1,570
PHAs, previous period
(table 10)
e. % Level 2 PHAs (table
0
0
48.2%
79.7%
94.5%
8)
f. PHAs detected by 2039
124
255
416
759
1842
(table 11)
Calculate:
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2053
124
255
478
869
1933
= row f – row d +row c
1b. Approaches to Object
2.72
3.48
3.79
3.35
2.07
ratio
1c. Approaches per period
0
0
12
89
168
for new PHA detections
= row c * row 1b/20.4
2. % PHAs detected to
99.4%
99%
99%
23%
10%
Level 1 by 2053
= row 1 / row a
3. Missed approaches
2
9
18
9,844
36,0001900-2200
750,000
= (100%- row 2)* row b
4. Missed approaches this
.1
.43
.89
482
1,769
period (= row 3/20.4)
5. Level 2 PHAs this
0
0
30
429
1,570
period = row c *row e
Note: Table 12 shows that by 2053, virtually all of the objects over 300 m have been found
(item 2), but objects from 100- 300 m still have decades before completion. Objects 25- 100 m
may have several hundred years until completion, because even after 55 year, only 10 % will
be detected to level 1, with 1,769 approaches passing by undetected every 14 years.
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Table 13. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 20542067.
2054-2067 Projection
Given:
a. Total estimated PHAs

>1km

500m-1km

301-500m

100-300m

25-100m

125

255

478

3807

b. Total estimated
Approaches 19002200 (table 9 #1)
c. Projected PHA
detections this period
(table 5)
d. Expected # Level 2
PHAs, previous period
(table 12)
e. % Level 2 PHAs (table
8)
f. PHAs detected by 2053
(table 12)
Calculate:
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2067
= row f –
row d + row c
1b. Approaches to
Object ratio
1c. Approaches per
period for new PHA
detections = row c *
row 1b/20.4
2. % PHAs detected to
Level 1 by 2067
= row 1 / row a
3. Missed approaches
1900-2200
= (100%- row2)* row
b
4. Missed approaches this
period (= row 3/20.4)
5. Level 2 PHAs this
period
= row c * row e

339

888

1,811

12,756

19,433389,000
40,000750,000

0

0

30

539

1,661

0

0

30

429

1,570

Unkn.

Unkn.

48.2%

79.7%

94.5%

124

255

478

869

1933

124

255

478

979

2024

2.72

3.48

3.79

3.35

2.07

0

0

0

89

168

99.4%

99%

99%

26%

10%

2

9

18

9,477

35,900749,000

.1

.43

.89

463

1,760

0

0

14

429

1,570

Note: This table shows the final period projected. By 2067, virtually all of the objects over 300
m have been found by the end of this time period, but objects from 100- 300 m still have
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decades before completion. Objects 25- 100 m, because of uncertainty levels, have advanced
less than 1% in completion, with 1,760 approaches passing by undetected every 14 years.

Future Close Approach Warning Times
The next step was to combine the data from the preceding table with the graphs
in the section “detection-to-approach times for known objects” to develop a picture of
when warning times into the 0.05 AU MOID will be long enough on average to provide
time for a pre-cursor transponder mission if necessary. The amount of time needed to
act on an object is debatable, but for the purposes of this study 25-60 years was used,
falling loosely in line with previously cited NASA Administrator Mike Griffin’s
testimony. As with the known object close approaches the next part of the process
begins again at the >1000 m size bin, this time adding in estimates for missed
detections and lost objects as calculated in the last tables. In the histograms that follow,
all values from the previous histograms showing known object warning times are
present, except that all negative warning times are grouped as “≤0”. Negative warning
times (and 0 warning times) for a 0.05 MOID penetration represent a failure of our
detection systems, no matter how small or large the negative value is. Missed approach
warning times, in these graphs, are also grouped in the ≤0 bin, because if an object

penetrates the 0.05 AU MOID without any detection, our detection systems have failed
to provide warning. Projected detections are added in as a uniform distribution over the
14 year period of detection. Other possibilities would include using a normal
distribution, or a random distribution. Evidence of the 7300 events shows a fairly
uniform distribution of approaches, as previously shown in figure 17, when
observational bias due to small object uncertainties is removed. Chapter III, Results,
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contains the charts that attempts to combine all of this information.

Potential Improvements to the Method
The methodology developed here is not meant to be a definitive answer with no
error associated to it. Rather, the method is something that over time could be
developed into a mechanism by which more accurate warning times could be derived.
A few additions and improvements to the method would be desirable, either as a post
graduate project, or as a development within the NEO community. The following
paragraphs discuss such possible improvements.

Better refinement of the estimates of total PHAs would greatly improve the

model. In this study, PHAs came from estimates for total NEAs and the percentage of
NEAs so far discovered.
A more refined technique for estimating the total number of missed PHAs and
missed approaches is another possible improvement. This could involve Monte Carlo
simulations using a synthetic NEA population. Another method might compare past
technology non-detections to current technology detections.
Another improvement would be improved statistical research on the distribution
of warning times for future discoveries. Are warning times distributed over a uniform,
normal, or Poisson distribution?
Improved methods for determine the percentage of objects that are lost or that
have high uncertainty trajectory rates could improve the model. This could involve
using the JPL database to determine the number of objects that have been viewed on
more than one opposition.
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A thorough study of the distribution of PHA and NEA orbits as related to
discovery rates would be an improvement. Are current observation techniques missed a
particular subset of NEAs, such as those with high inclinations, or those which have
periods that might keep them hidden by the sun?
Another consideration is the usage of a disk rather than a MOID. NEAs with
high inclinations may potentially have less chance of striking the Earth than those
whose orbits are close to the ecliptic (M. Gaffey, personal communication, 18 April
2012).
Smaller size bins could be examined. It is becoming apparent that the next
actionable EI will be in the less than 500 m size range, and most likely under 300 m.
However, a refined study could potentially estimate this on a continuous graph rather
than by large size bins. Is the most likely size 100 or 200 m?
Sensitivity checks could be carried out to see what the answer is should variations
in the inputs be within some range. For example, the average albedo of PHAs used in
this model is .14 based on the most current estimates. A sensitivity check could be
carried out to determine the effects on the results if this average albedo were changed
by one or two standard deviations in either direction.
The above suggestions could potentially make the method and model more robust.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
General Description
Beginning with the largest size objects, the following histograms represent the
predictions for future warning times for approaches within 0.05 AU of the earth that
this nascent model provides. The data displayed is divided into three categories. One
color depicts close approach warning times of known objects from the NEO-P
database, as previously displayed in the warning charts earlier in this thesis. Another
color depicts the estimated missed approaches previously discussed. Again, missed
approaches are given a warning time value of 0. Another color depicts estimated close
approaches of newly discovered objects.
PHAs > 1000 m
The following three histograms display warning times for penetrations of the
0.05 AU MOID counts for PHAs greater than 1000 m or H<17.75, during the years
1998-2011 and two subsequent periods. These graphs contain a fairly obvious set of
conclusions, namely that Spaceguard has been a success for this size range. During the
first period, most PHAs in this size range passed through the MOID with less than 21
years of warning, although a few approaches were anticipated by over 60 years. One
approach, in red, is the estimated number of missed approaches during that time period.
In other words, there was likely one undiscovered PHA over 1000 m that passed within
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the 0.05 AU MOID during that time period, as shown in table 10. In the later period,
most penetrations of the MOID happen with between 6 and 48 years of warning, with a
very small chance of a single missed approach. Between 2026 and 2039, all
penetrations within the MOID will have been anticipated by over 24 years, with no
missed approaches.

Figure 15. Close Approach Warning Times 1997-2011, D> 1 km.
This figure shows that for most penetrations of the 0.05 AU MOID, there between 0 and
21 years warning time. For example, 2 PHAs were detected 12 years before their close
approaches. As estimated in table 10, there is 1 approach (shown in red) by an
undetected large object within the 0.05 AU MOID during this time period.
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Figure 16. Close Approach Warning Times 2012-2025, D> 1 km.
In the next 14 years, every penetration of the MOID will have been anticipated by over
6 years, with 43% of approaches known for over 30 years. There is still a slight chance
of a missed approach (0 warning time) in this time period.

Figure 17. Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039, D> 1 km.
In the period from 2026-2039, 78% of approaches by large objects will have over 30
years warning time, and 99% will have over 24 years. There is still a very slight
chance of a missed approach as shown in table 12. These results were fairly obvious
given the known success of Spaceguard with this size range.
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The following graph sums up the anticipated progression of early warning for
large object penetrations of the 0.05 AU MOID from 1984 through 2039. From the end
of the Spaceguard’s first 14 years, up through the present, these 0.05 penetration
warning times move up significantly. The mean is 27.4 years for projected 2012-2025
approaches, incorporating the single missed approach. This climbs to a mean of 38.07
for 2026-2039 approaches, well beyond the previously mentioned 30 years in Mike
Griffin’s testimony, which, though somewhat arbitrary, is a reasonable estimate for
carrying out the full target-cycle, which will include first additional ground
observations, then a precursor mission to determine the necessity of the deflection
mission, and then the deflection mission.

Figure 18. 3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D> 1 km.
This graph displays a fairly obvious high success rate for Spaceguard with large
objects. The right side of this chart shows the periods studied, beginning at the back
with the earliest and moving forward to the projected periods.
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Figure 18 displays an obvious result for large objects, Spaceguard has been a
success. All PHAs in this size range will be discovered and tracked with enough
certainty to provide an average of 27 years notice of their next penetrations into the
MOID within the 2012-2025 period. Following this period, warning times for
penetrations will continue to increase.

Figure 19. Close Approach Warning Times 1998-2011 D= 500-1000m.
Depicted are the 8.69 missed approaches (in red), along with the majority of known
approaches with under 3 years warning time.
PHAs ~500- 1000 m
Spaceguard has had and will have almost as good success for PHAs in the 5001000 m size range. The following graphs show that during the first period, most PHAs
in this size range passed through the MOID with less than 6 years of warning. There
were approximately 9 missed approaches (in red) of undiscovered PHA in this size
range, as shown in table 9. In the following period, most penetrations of the MOID
happen with between 6 and 42 years warning. However, as table 10 shows, there are
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projected to be eight approaches by newly discovered PHAs in this size range within
the next 14 years, as well as 0.68 missed approaches by PHAs not yet discovered.
Also, most warning times for MOID penetration will be above 21 years. PHAs
discovered during the 2012-2025 time period will have some corresponding approaches
in the 2025-2039 period. These estimated approaches of newly discovered objects are
in green. Between 2026 and 2039, 89% of penetrations of the 0.05 AU MOID will
have early warning of over 15 years, with no missed approaches. In the following
period, 92% of penetrations will have over 30 years warning time.

Figure 20. Close Approach Warning Times 2012-2025 D= 500-1000m.
Here we see a small chance of having a missed approach (in red). Additionally, an
estimated 8 penetrations will occur during this time period of PHAs discovered after
2011 (see table 11, row 1c.). These are given warning times of less than or equal to
zero due to lack of information, although it is more likely that some spread around zero
would be the case. The rest of the penetrations have over 6 years warning time.
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Figure 21. Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039 D= 500-1000m.
About 52% of 0.05 AU penetrations after 2026 will have over 30 years warning time,
when accounting for missed approaches and approaches of objects discovered after
2011. Projected discoveries after 2012 are given a uniform distribution (in green).

Figure 22. Close Approach Warning Times 2040-2053 D= 500-1000m.
Including all missed approaches, approaches of objects discovered after 2011, and
approaches of all currently known (prior to 2011) objects, 92% will provide over 30
years warning time for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID.
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By 2011 80% of 500-1000 m objects have been detected. Warning times for
penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID are projected to move up to a mean of 20.9 in the
next 14 years. Mean penetration warning time grows to 33.5 years for 2026-2039
approaches, because by this time, most objects will have been discovered, with only a
slight chance of a missed approach. By the period 2054-2067, all approaches will be
anticipated by over 30 years, and 61% of approaches will have over 60 years of
warning time. This gives enough time to go through all necessary decision points in a
layered planetary defense.

Figure 23. 3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D= 500-1000.
Warning times for penetration are already moving up quickly for this size bin. By 2026,
30 years warning time for penetration of the MOID will be common.
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PHAs ~300- 500 m
Spaceguard has some success for PHAs in the 300-500 m size range, but
progress in the next two periods will be critical in establishing completeness within this
size range. The following graphs show that during the first period, most PHAs in this
size range passed through the MOID with less than 1 year of warning. Table 9 displays
48 missed approaches (in red) of undiscovered PHA in this size range. The following
period shows little progress, because of an anticipated 30 missed approaches and 36
approaches of newly detected objects. Between 2026 and 2039, only 29% of
penetrations within the MOID will likely have early warning of over 24 years, due to
the anticipated number of missed approaches and new discoveries still occuring in that
period. A factor that causes a delay of completion in this size group is the higher
uncertainties in the trajectories. In the following period, 33% of penetrations will have
over 24 years warning time, and 63% will have over 10 years warning time.

Figure 24. Close Approach Warning Times 1998-2011, D= 300-500 m.
A high number of approaches in this size bin, estimated at 48, have been missed since
the 1998 congressional mandate, which applied only to larger objects. 84% of
penetrations had warning times less than 1 year, (the first two columns).
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Figure 25. Close Approach Warning Times 2012-2025 D= 300-500 m.
Approaches of newly discovered PHAs and missed approaches will bring the average
penetration warning times down close to 0 in this period.

Figure 26. Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039 D= 300-500 m.
As newly objects projected for discovery after 2012 provide longer warning times in
this period, the picture improves a little. About 30% of penetrations should have
warning times over 24 years in this time period.
77

Figure 27. Close Approach Warning Times 2040-2053 D= 300-500 m.
Here, the missed approach rate declines, as the population of 300-500 m objects
reaches completion. Newly discovered objects also decline as the population reaches
completion. By the next period there will be virtually no missed approaches or newly
discovered objects.
The following summary chart shows that early warning times for penetration
will go from near 0 to over 24 years for 33% of PHAs in this size range by the end of
2053. By 2067, after completion, warning times will reach the required 30 years for
most objects.

Figure 28. 3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D= 300-500.
In the first period, penetration warning times were below 0, and moved to below 1 in
the period since the 1998 congressional mandate. In the next period (2012-2025) 38%
of penetrations will provide over 10 years warning time. 63% of penetrations from
2040-2053 will provide over 10 years warning time, and 33% will provide over 24
years.
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The delay in having reliable warning times comes from the high uncertainties in
trajectories of 48.5% of PHAs (see table 8) in this size range. This uncertainty,
accompanied by the high number of PHAs in this size range, has the potential to delay
completion for several decades. If the uncertainty level can be reduced through greater
funding, the length of time until completion can be cut significantly, giving more
warning time for penetration of this early layer for planetary defense. The reduction of
uncertainties may require re-observation, re-discovery, and observation over long arc
lengths for new discoveries. Uncertainty in the orbital trajectory plays an even greater
role in the 100-300 m bin, which is addressed next.
PHAs ~100- 300 m
PHAs in this size bin are more numerous than all of the PHAs larger than 300 m
combined. Table 5 shows the estimate of total PHAs in this size range at 3,807,
whereas there are only an estimated 478 PHAs in the 300-500 m range. Because
progress is much slower in this size bin, only every other period is shown in the graphs
below. In the first period, over 500 missed penetrations of 0.05 AU occur. In the
2026-2039 period, there are still 500 projected missed penetrations and 168 approaches
by newly discovered PHAs. Even as late as 2054-2067, there are 463 missed
penetrations and still some 168 approaches by newly discovered (or re-discovered)
PHAs. Because the population is so large, and uncertainty so high, completion will
take a very long time for this size bin, and warning times will remain very low for the
majority of approaches.
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Figure 29. Close Approach Warning Times 1998-2011 D= 100-300 m.
Note the high number of missed approaches, because so many PHAs in this size bin
remain to be discovered. Warning times for a only few approaches are greater than 1
year, barely discernible compared to the number of approaches with less than 1 year
warning time.

Figure 30. Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039 D= 100-300 m.
Missed approaches are still high, overshadowing the also high number of approaches
by newly discovered PHAs. Many newly discovered PHAs in this size bin have high
uncertainties to their orbital trajectories, requiring them to be re-discovered.
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Figure 31. Close Approach Warning Times 2054-2067 D= 100-300 m.
By this time period there are slightly fewer missed penetrations, and penetrations by
newly discovered PHAs continue. The number of approaches with warning times over
24 years, at 78, is fairly high compared to other size bins, but the percentage is very
low.
Projections were only carried out to 2067 for this project. However, as
discussed regarding table 5, if average rates of discovery continue for the foreseeable
future, it would take 86.3 years (past 2011) to reach completion, without taking into
account trajectory uncertainties. Because uncertainties are high in this size bin, it could
take several hundred years to reach completion of the population. However, even
before completion is reached, a great many objects will be discovered, yielding a good
chance of finding an EI among them. For this reason, the 100-300 m size bin may yield
both a surprise strike by an EI and an EI with well over 30 years of warning time.
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Figure 32. 3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D= 100-300.
This graph shows that progress will be slow for warning times in this size range. On
the left side, the total of missed approaches and new discoveries remains high well into
the period of 2054-2067. Most approaches even in 2054 will have less than 1 year of
warning time. If one of these turned out to be a potential EI, there would be little
opportunity to employ the rest of the layers of defense. However, this population also
provides some opportunity for discovery of an EI with over 30 years warning time, due
to the high discovery numbers relative to other size bins.
Very Small PHAs ~ 25- 100 m
Because projections were only accomplished out to 2067, the Very Small PHAs
of 25-100 m in diameter (~22.8< H<25.7) did not show any progress in terms of
warning time for MOID penetration. The number of missed approaches in each period
is over 1,700, and the new and lost detections so high that it will take potentially an
order of magnitude improvement in finding and tracking NEOs to consider this size
viable for early warning. Yet this is also the bin containing the next most likely
surprise EI (no warning) to cause damage somewhere on the Earth.
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It may take over a millennium to reach completion for this size bin, and to
therefore have reliable warning for every penetration of the MOID. However, counter
intuitively, this size bin may still provide an EI with over 30 years of warning, simply
because there are so many PHAs being discovered in this size range all the time, as
discussed in the following section.
The Next Known EI versus the Next Surprise Strike
Several of the graphs for the smaller objects previously shown have bimodal
distributions, displaying both high number of MOID penetrations with under 1 year
warning, and a high number with over 30 years warning time. This illustrates the
reality of the PHA targeting problem: there is a reasonable chance that the size bin will
yield both an EI with over 30 years warning time as well as a surprise EI that strikes
with very little, if any, warning.
It is well known that the smaller the object is (down to 25 m), the more likely it
will strike the Earth, because of the high numbers in the lower diameter populations.
Our PHA population estimates in table 5 show over ~19,400- 400,000 PHAs in the 25100 m range, with over ~18,260-399,000 left to detect. In the 100-300 m range, there
are over 3,800, with over 3,300 left to detect. This means that there is over an 83-99%
chance that the next EI to strike without warning will come from the 25-100 m
population of PHAs, followed by a 1-15% chance it will come from the 100-300 m
bin. There is an exceedingly small chance (<<1%) that the next surprise EI will be
greater than 300 m, and this chance will continue to decline as the remaining
population is discovered.
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However, determination of the size of the next EI to strike with over 30 years of
warning time is more complex. These must come from the population of discovered
objects. Small PHAs are discovered frequently. Yet, as discussed in depth in Chapter
II, a great number of small PHAs have too few observations to reliably predict their
orbits for more than a couple of decades, and generally not out to 30 years. The
following table considers our previous estimates of discovery rates and uncertainty
rates.
Table 14. Probability of Next EI with 30 Years Warning Time Coming from a Size
Bin.
2012-2025
Est. PHA
Discovery
rates (14 yr)
Est. Level 2
PHAs
Level 1 PHAs
% next
known EI:

500m-1km

301-500m

100-300m

25-100m

> 1km
9

47

193

539

1661

0%

0%

48%

80%

95%

9

47

100

109

84

349

2.5%

13.5%

28.7%

31.2%

24.1%

100%

Total
2448

Note: This table, with data pulled from previously explained tables 5 and 8, shows that
three times as many PHAs are currently discovered in the 25-100 m bin as in the 100300 m bin. And almost three times as many PHAs are discovered in the 100-300 m
bin as in the 300-500 m bin. Yet objects whose trajectories have high uncertainty are
more common in the 25-100 m range (95%) than in the 100-300 m range (80%). Once
all objects with high uncertainty are removed from the discovery population, the 100300 m bin is left with 109 objects whose trajectories can be projected out to 2200.
Only 84 objects have such certainty among the 25-100m size bin.
Estimates in the above table are discussed in the “Detection Rates for New

Objects” section and the “Level 2 PHAs: High Orbital Uncertainties” section in

Chapter II. The main conclusions drawn from this analysis is that the next EI with
over roughly 30 years of warning time has a fairly equal likelihood of being drawn
from the 100-300 m, 300-500 m, or 25-100 m size bins, with the most likely to be
84

found in the 100-300 m size bin (31%). This probability distribution will change in
future periods, as the larger size bins reach completion. Currently, if an EI with over
30 years warning time is discovered in the next period, there a reasonable chance it
could come from the 300-500 m bin (28%). It should be emphasized that this does
not mean there is a high chance of an impact for objects 300-500 m in diameter. As
Don Yeomans, manager of NASA’s NEO program office at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory explained to Space.com, for 500 meters (1640 feet), this is a mean interval
of about 100,000 years.
When you get down to 50 meters, the mean interval is about 700 years, and for
30 meters, about 140 years or so, but by then you’re getting down to a size where you
won’t expect any ground damage, as they burn up in the atmosphere at about 25
meters in diameter and smaller, probably for an impressive fireball event. (Choi,
2009, p. 1)
Dr. Yeoman’s statement above underscore that if an object is less than 25
meters, there is little need to be concerned about the risk. For this reason, this lower
threshold was used throughout this analysis. Objects above 25 m may, with the right
composition and trajectories, make it through the atmosphere to cause impact the
Earth. Clearly, objects in the 25-100 m and 100-300 m size ranges have a higher
chance of containing an EI than the population above 300 m. However, when looking
purely at the chance for finding an EI with over 30 years of warning time, the outlook
changes somewhat. The 100-300 m range may very well have the highest chance of
yielding an EI with warning time over 30 years, but only slightly greater than the
chance of such an EI coming from the 25-100 m range or the 300-500 m range.
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The uncertainty in these answers lies principally in the estimates for the total
number of PHAs in each size bin. While the total number of NEOs have been
estimated through simulation, the number of PHAs is still unknown, though there are
some estimates stating that the total number of PHAs should be 21% of the number of
NEOs (L. Johnson, personal communication, Feb 12, 2012). Further refinement of
these estimates would help reduce the error levels of this thesis. However, the answer
will still involve a high number of very small objects along with a high uncertainty in
the trajectories of their orbits, yielding a low number of objects discovered with
predictable orbits.
One assumption in this analysis is that observation technology, techniques,
funding, and focus of the scientific community will remain the same. If the
community decides that focusing on the small objects is not worthwhile, the time for
survey completion could remain quite a long period. However, if technology
continues to increase rapidly, completion of even the 25-100 m objects might be
conceivable.
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CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION OF RESULTS: MISSION CAMPAIGNS
Subsequent Layers: The Importance of a Transponder Mission
Within the layered defense approach, our results show distributions of the time
between detecting an object and its next close approach to the Earth as a parallel to
impact warning times and as a time frame within which a decision must be made for
further action. As discussed in our overview at the beginning of this thesis, possible
decisions to be made within the early warning period for each close approach include,
in order of necessity:
1. Ignore the NEA.
2. Focus additional ground based telescopes at the NEA.
3. Focus RADAR assets on the NEA if possible.
4. Launch a precursor characterization/transponder mission.
5. Launch near-simultaneous observation and deflection missions.
6. Evacuation.
7. Recovery operations.
Beyond the initial layer of knowing that an object is coming within the 0.05 AU
MOID, the probabilities of impact must be further refined. Additional ground
observations, radar, and a precursor mission are the next layers. Possibly the most
significant single piece of information that a precursor mission would need to
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determine would be the answer to the questions “What are the odds of the object hitting
us?” There is a great deal of uncertainty in orbital refinements. Several passes of a
NEO may be required before ground observations can tell if a NEO will have a high
probability of being an EI. Chesley and Spahr (2004) accomplished a case study of the
“rate at which the probability of an impending impact increases after discovery”
(Chesley & Spahr, 2004, p. 34). In their simulation, an object discovered in 1983 and
destined to hit in 2000 is determined to be harmless after initial observation. Years
later, when the object is again observable, the future impact is confirmed, leaving less
time for deflection attempts (Chesley & Spahr, 2004, p. 35).
A recent example of the application of this concept is 2011 AG5, an object
which currently has the highest known chance of impacting the Earth (on its pass in
2040). The chance is estimated at 1 in 625. “Processing additional observations in the
2013-2016 time period,” Don Yeomans told space.com, “will almost certainly see the
impact probability for 2011 AG5 significantly decrease.” (David, 2012, p. 1). In this
case, enough observational opportunity will exist for 2011 AG5 well prior to 2040 to
ease the pressure on decision-makers. However, if the next chance for observation was
not until 2030 or 2035, the US government would have to decide if a 1 in 625 chance of
impact merits launching a precursor transponder mission to the object.
For this reason, the author advocates a multi-layered approach with defined
probability levels past which the next stage is activated. For example, a potential EI
whose probability of impact reaches above some predefined amount should become the
immediate subject of a global observation campaign, including RADAR observations.
Once uncertainties are further resolved, if the NEA still provides a sufficient
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probability of threat and enough time, the next stage should be implemented- that of an
immediate, inexpensive and uncomplicated precursor transponder mission. As the
transponder mission is flying to the NEA, more expensive long-term transponderobservation and deflection missions could be designed and assembled as necessary.
Tens of billions of dollars could be spent to deflect or destroy a PHA presumed,
incorrectly, to be on a collision course with the Earth. For this reason, sending a
transponder mission to a PHA with a reasonably high chance of being an EI might be
essential for determining if the NEO is indeed an EI. However, it is a difficult and
politicized decision to determine the best minimum probability before such a mission is
deemed necessary. For example, if a PHA in the 140 m size range has a 1 in 625
chance to strike, how long are NASA, congress, the President, and other nations likely
to wait before taking action? In our current fiscally constrained environment, if added
ground observations are soon possible, clearly the proper decision is the wait.
However, what if the same odds applied and no more ground-based observations would
become available prior to the threatening flyby? What level of risk are we willing to
tolerate, and at what level do we make the hard decision to send a precursor mission?
Decisions currently take place on a case by case basis, and no known NEO represents
sufficiently high probability of near term impact to justify an expensive mission. But
more ideally, there would be some minimum parameters above which the government
would fund and mandate action, first in the form of a low-cost precursor observertransponder mission, and secondly in a more expensive campaign of observer and
deflection missions.
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Purpose of a Transponder/Observer Mission in the Targeting Cycle
As discussed, a precursor transponder mission could determine orbital
parameters to such a degree that the EI is determined to no longer be a threat,
potentially saving the international community from large expenditures related to
deflection attempts. Moreover, if the trajectory of the NEA is shown to be on a near
miss with the Earth, deflection techniques might be better avoided, so as to not disturb
the object and turn it into an EI. And if deflection is necessary, a transponder would
likely be required for any deflection attempts and for post-deflection observation to find
out the level of success. In the Air Force, this sort of post- impact assessment is
analogous to “Battle Damage Assessment,” an essential part of the Air Force’s
targeting cycle.

Figure 33. Joint Publication 3-60 “Joint Doctrine for Targeting”.
This Time-Sensitive Targeting Process can easily apply to the NEA target set.
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Figure 33 contains a typical example of the unclassified joint targeting cycle. In
my professional career, I was part of this targeting process during the intense
Afghanistan bombing campaign in the months after 9-11, and also in weaponeering
prior to the second Gulf War. What is striking is how relevant this targeting cycle is to
the NEA problem set. Detecting, locating, and identifying NEAs is currently being
carried out by Spaceguard, and would be further carried out by the precursor observertransponder mission. The decision point in the target cycle, one would presume, must
lie with the President and/or Congress with (currently) recommendations from NASA
for funding a campaign of missions to the NEA. Once deflection is attempted,
assessment of the target would be required through the still active observer/transponder
mission, after which a new decision for retargeting would take place.
The first key element in any targeting cycle is to gain as much detailed
information about the target as possible. During the targeting of potential Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) going into the second Gulf War, a widespread assumption
was that there was, indeed, WMD in Iraq. This assumption, however, was not
supported by all in the targeting community. During subsequent congressional
inquiries, it became apparent that no considerable amount of WMD existed, and an
investigation began to find out how the error was allowed to propagate (Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 2006, p. 4). A critical series of informational errors had
taken place, causing or allowing immense resources to be allocated towards a lengthy
war. This serves as an example of how the early stages of targeting- ascertaining the
true nature of the target- are without a doubt the most critical.
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Subsequent important stages of the process include developing targeting
packages that address the most likely characteristics of the target. After adequate
characterization, an attempt to destroy the target takes place, followed by another
important process, assessment of the target after impact. All of these must take place in
the targeting of an EI.
Characterization Data Necessary for Mitigation
Most importantly, a precursor observer- transponder mission could supply
precise orbital parameters and mass/density distribution, due to the fact that these are
required to determine whether the NEA is an EI, and if so, how much damage it can
inflict. Other important data needed include shape models, rotation rates, gravity
distribution, moment of inertia, chemical composition, and internal structure. Prior to
embarking on a precursor mission to obtain this data, all attempts from groundobservation to yield as much data as possible should be carried out, both to determine
the necessity of the precursor mission and to assist the mission, in the event that it must
take place.
Prior to sending a precursor mission, it is important to have a general idea of the
size and mass of the threatening NEA. The most likely size will be in the 100-300 m
range, with possibilities in the 300-500 m and 25-100 m ranges. Close-proximity
operations around small bodies such as these are complex. Scheeres (2004) states that
orbits about small bodies can become rapidly destabilized and result in impact or
escape velocity in a matter of hours, rather than thousands to millions of years
(Scheeres, 2004, p. 2). He emphasizes that small bodies, with their large range of
physical parameters, will merit very different concepts in terms of close-proximity
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operations. He discusses a case study of the NEAR approach to Eros versus
Hayabusa's approach to the smaller Itokawa. These missions required substantially
different designs due to vast differences in the bodies, particularly the mass difference.
This meant that for Itokawa, the spacecraft used more station-keeping, in essence
almost hovering around the object, which meant differences in terms of fuel, placement
of instruments, and more (Scheeres, 2004, pp. 1-2). Therefore, radar imaging and
precise optical imaging of a NEO would be ideal prior to embarking on a threat
mitigation mission or a precursor to that mission.
Alternatives and Mission Times for a Precursor/Transponder Mission
A precursor transponder mission could involve placement of a device onto the
surface of the NEO, or simply conducting long term close-proximity orbits of the object
using a radio science package for distance measurements from Earth. The mission
could be designed for a direct short term stay near the body (a few years) using already
developed technologies for costs that would be low relative to a deflection mission,
which might be determined to be unneeded due to the refinement of the orbit. Or it
could be designed for more sophisticated, long-term stay for pre- and post- deflection
purposes, which would likely cost more. The design and test of an inexpensive, rapidly
deployable precursor transponder mission would be a step in the right direction. The
precursor mission should be designed for objects in the 100-300 m range, based on this
analysis. Another recommendation is continued design of a robust suite of observation
and deflection missions that would follow the initial precursor mission. Finally, testing
of a kinetic deflector against a benign NEO in the 100-300 m size range would provide
real world experience for planetary defense.
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Charania, Olds, and Koenig of Spaceworks carried out recent work on
Foresight, an inexpensive precursor mission designed as an Apophis mission. The
Planetary Society’s Apophis Mission Design Competition awarded first prize to the
Foresight mission for its “low-cost, conventionally propelled orbiter with only two
instruments and a single band [X-band] radio tracking system” (The Planetary Society,
2008). Spaceworks wrote a mission design document for a transponder mission that
would co-orbit the sun with Apophis. NASA scientists at JPL initially thought
Apophis, a roughly 270 m object, had a reasonably high 2.7% chance of impacting the
Earth in 2029 (Brown, 2009). With additional observations, they were able to rule out
the 2029 impact, but will be watching it closely as it passes very close to the Earth to
the Earth at around 31,000 km (Brown, 2009), which is inside the orbit of our
geosynchronous satellites. Initially, scientists were also concerned that in 2029, “if
Apophis passes through a several-hundred-meter-wide ‘keyhole’ in space during this
approach, it will impact the Earth in 2036” (Charania, p. 1). However, “updated
computational techniques and newly available data indicate the probability of an Earth
encounter on April 13, 2036 for Apophis has dropped from one-in-45,000 to about
four-in-a million” (Brown, 2009). Nevertheless, Apophis’ close passes to the Earth
make it ideally suited for testing a transponder precursor mission.
Wertz breaks down a spacecraft into the following subsystems: propulsion,
control systems, on-board processing, communications and power, and structures and
thermal, as well as payload, ground system, and launch operations (Wertz, 2011, pp. vivii). Looking at the Foresight mission for these elements, Charania uses “a single bipropellant chemical main engine and a number of small thrusters” for Foresight’s
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propulsion (Charania, p. 2). Ion propulsion has recently matured enough to where this
might be the preferred mechanism (M. Gaffey, personal communication, 18 Apr, 2012).
On-board processing includes a central processing unit (PowerPC 750FX), a
solid state drive, and an electronics module. Control systems include four reaction
control system thrusters, several sun sensors, two star trackers, and an inertial
measurement unit. Foresight uses both high and low gain antennas for
communications, and it has two solar arrays as its primary power source, augmented by
batteries (Charania, p. 1). For the payload design, Charania et al. felt that a laser
altimeter and camera were “the minimum suite of instruments one would need in order
to provide the data to reduce future orbital uncertainty (A. Charania, personal
communication, December 4, 2012). All of these fit into an 85 cm X 85 cm X 70 cm
box, with a total mission cost estimate of only $131 M (FY2007 constant U.S. dollars) ,
including the $22 M stated for the Minotaur IV launch vehicle. For the launch,
Charania used a Propulsive Transfer Vehicle (PTV), “a simple bi-propellant chemical
stage, to assist in achieving the necessary Earth departure velocity”, after initial launch
on an Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) Minotaur IV launch vehicle from Wallops
Flight Facility in Virginia (Charania, pp. 1-2).
The Foresight would, if launched on May 9, 2012, take 310 days to transfer
from Earth to Apophis, followed by a 10 day Initial Survey period and a 30 day
Observation period during which it would orbit Apophis to determine its shape,
rotation, and gravity model. It would then retreat from orbiting Apophis and enter a
trailing orbit 2 km behind the asteroid’s center of mass, for the modeled minimum of
300 days required to reduce the error ellipse down to 6 km (Charania, pp. 3-4). Added
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together, this would yield 650 days for mission success, plus a waiting time for the
window of approximately 5 years after the initial design, for a total of approximately 7
years’ time to mission success after the proposal.
This 7-year time to mission success provides a direct link in to the warning time
estimations. After ground –based instruments determine some minimum chance of a
NEA being an EI, we can see that the precursor transponder mission alone will
consume a sizeable chunk of time. Bruce Willis would age perhaps a decade or more
before being able to board the Space Shuttle and rocket off with a nuclear weapon.
Early warning is vital.
The second (A-Track) and third-prize (APEX) competitors estimated their costs
at $387.2 M and $497.8 M respectively. A-Track proposed a payload of 2 cameras, a
thermal radiometer, a visual and near-IR spectrometer, and a dual band (Ka and X)
tracking system. It was larger and more massive than Foresight (540.2 kg versus 100.2
kg), with a correspondingly larger solar panel size (6 m2 versus 1.2 m2). A-Track
proposed a 2013 or 2014 launch on a Boeing Delta II 7926, with rendezvous at Apophis
10-15 months later. Like Foresight, it would orbit Apophis for a preliminary period (5
months, longer than Foresight’s 30 days). However, in lieu of leaving orbit to trail
behind Apophis, Deimos Space, the creators of A-Track, proposed having the
spacecraft withdraw to a stable orbit, well-away from Apophis, further out for a sixmonth tracking period (The Planetary Society, 2008). Again, with the waiting time for
an appropriate launch window, the total time would be on the order of 6-7 years to
mission success.
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APEX, the most expensive of the three winners was a solar-electric propelled
spacecraft that would be theoretically launched on a Soyuz Fregat between 2012 and
2015, to arrive 9 to 21 months later. Like the other two, it would arrive and accomplish
a preliminary study of the asteroid’s parameters, with added capabilities due to its
extensive sensor suite of six instruments: 2 cameras, a laser altimeter, a visible and
near-IR spectrometer, and an accelerometer, along with a dual band (KA and X)
tracking system. With this more sophisticated instrument suite, EADS can accomplish
a thermal mapping campaign for what it argues are essential estimates of the Yarkovski
effect and Solar Radiation Pressure (SRP) on both Apophis and the spacecraft. APEX
would track Apophis for at least an Apophis year after its initial observation period,
with a potential additional year under some conditions (Allouis, et al., 2007, pp. 1-5).
The total time to mission success for APEX is on the order of 5-7 years when adding
launch window wait time to transit time and mission completion time.di
Proposed Campaign Architecture
For a 100-300 m object with warning time of over 30 years, the use of a mission
similar to one of the above Planetary Society winning proposals for an inexpensive
rapidly deployed precursor mission would be desirable. Secondly, a more robust
observation mission to follow is advocated, should the initial precursor mission
demonstrate conclusively that a NEA is indeed an EI. This mission would be required
to loiter near the NEA, providing similar transponder and other characterization data as
the above missions, with the potential addition of an observation role during and after a
potential mitigation attempt. This follow-on precursor campaign would either require a
more robust power source to keep it active for a longer period, or it would need to
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involve of a series of inexpensive observer spacecraft that would be launched
periodically to replace and/or augment previous observer missions.
Rather than orbit the NEA, or after doing so for a period of time, the spacecraft
would pull back and co-orbit the sun in close proximity to the NEA, far enough from it
so that a deflection mission would not adversely affect it. This might not be too
complicated if the deflection method chosen were a kinetic strike or the use of a gravity
tractor. However, the use of a nuclear bomb as a deflection device may create
complexity in terms of the radiation effects on the spacecraft. The degree of hardening
and distance from the center of mass of the NEA might require modeling, likely based
on models used within the Department of Energy and DoD for modeling nuclear blasts.
A solution for preparing for such an environment might be to have the observation
mission positioned on the opposite side of the NEA from the blast. Because there is no
atmosphere involved, this could very well be enough to protect the spacecraft (M.
Gaffey, personal communication, 18 Apr 2012).
Alternatively, a new transponder mission could be launched to arrive shortly
after the mitigation mission. The campaign would include a means of initial scouting
(the precursor), a follow-up long term observation mission, the mitigation, and the
critical post-mitigation assessment-observation mission. After deflection attempts, a
critical period would ensue to re-measure the orbit of the NEA, with the hopes that it
shifted enough.
If warning times are less than 30 years, the multiple spacecraft in this campaign
might be sent near simultaneously. For this reason, an already designed, inexpensive
precursor mission, ready for rapid launch would be an important part of such a
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campaign architecture. With 10 years warning time, for example, the precursor would
launch as soon as a certain probability for impact threshold is reached, and as soon as a
window became available, completing its mission within the next 7 years. The followon observer mission and mitigation missions would be built in a crash program similar
to the Apollo program to get to the moon, and might be sent while the precursor is still
enroute.
The Most Likely Target
Such a transponder mission and/or campaign of several spacecraft, if launched
within the next few decades to centuries, would most likely be sent to an object in the
100-300 m range, as the research in this thesis points to. If observation technology
advances significantly, so that uncertainty rates for smaller objects decline
significantly, then the most likely object for a transponder mission would move to the
25-100 m range. With the high frequency of discoveries in this very small object
range, the only thing preventing an EI from being discovered is the uncertainty in its
trajectories. Until these uncertainties are overcome, the next detected EI giving any
time for a transponder mission will most likely come from the 100-300 m range,
followed by the 300-500 m range, and then the 25-100 m range. Therefore, closeproximity operations may be designed around these three general size ranges, and the
corresponding likely mass. While the mass range between 25 m and 500 m is
significant, it is far better constrained than trying to design for larger NEAs. This
means that the mission designs for Apophis, if tested, would provide proven technology
in the range of objects considered.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The next EI with actionable warning times (greater than 30 years) will most
likely come from the 100-300 m size bin, followed by the 300-500 m size bin, and
lastly the 25-100 m size bin. This conclusion came from a combination of estimates of
approach warning times, missed approaches, rates of occurrence of highly uncertain
orbits, and projected detection rates. Possible campaigns for dealing with potential EIs
discovered with enough actionable warning time to launch a precursor mission were
discussed. Examples of mission designs for the initial precursor transponder mission
were discussed, as well as a proposed campaign for follow-on observation and
deflection missions, using the Department of Defense Joint Targeting Cycle as a model
for carrying out such a deflection mission. A discussion of some technologies that
should probably be improved over the next few decades follows, along with a synopsis
of recommended paths forward to prepare for the different threats the Earth will face.
Future Technologies Essential to Spaceguard
This analysis has attempted to help focus the planetary defense efforts on
current capabilities and help identify gaps in them. One such gap comes from the high
uncertainties for the orbits of most objects less than 300 m, which, if overcome, will
rapidly ramp up the warning time for these objects. Until this is rectified, there will be
a substantial threat of little to no warning for many objects in the 100-300 m size-bin
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for several decades. For objects 25-100 m, this threat will remain for several centuries,
unless several order of magnitude improvements take place in observation technology
(ground and space-based). The following technologies should be maintained, and
improved if possible.
Radar Observations
Arecibo, at 300 m in diameter, is the most sensitive radar system in the world,
although it cannot be steered as well as the runner-up, NASA’s Deep Space Network
70 meter antenna in California. The Arecibo radar has carried out 65% of all radar
observations of NEOs, discovered 47% of known binary NEOs, and provided data for
higher precision orbit determination for a significant number of NEOs (Campbell,
2007, p. 2). But even with these impressive statistics, Arecibo faced the prospect of
being closed down, until Congress allocated funds to NASA with the charge to keep it
running.
New Methods of Surveying
Detection methods have advanced greatly in recent years. Chesley and Spahr
(2003) noted that “surveys will most readily detect impactors . . . in two fairly small
‘sweet spots’ situated within 15° of the ecliptic and 90-120° from opposition. Fainter
objects will be preferentially found in the opposition region” (p. 36). This has heralded
a new focus on observing in areas outside of opposition, yielding great results.
Dr. Spahr states that what we need is a “consistent survey to visual magnitudes
(V) of 23 or 24, or a dedicated follow-up system that can get us to V = 24 quickly.” (T.
Spahr, personal communication, March 1, 2012). He and other scientists involved in
Spaceguard have a wealth of understanding of the potential for improvements in
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existing technology. Surveying methods also need to work well with the overall goal
of finding objects that might strike Earth. Spahr explains that we need a way to flag the
NEAs that we are interested in and focus observations on them “at the discovery
apparition. Then key objects won’t ever get lost” (T. Spahr, personal communication,
March 1, 2012).
Diversion of just a few percent of funds from a major DOD or DHS program,
which may provide only marginal increases in national security considering our large
lead in that area, could enable huge dividends in planetary defense and inspire more
scientists to pursue space-related research.
New Space-Based Observations
Scientists such as Dr. Mainzer at JPL have made efforts for more space-based
observations in the IR, with proposed projects such as NEOCAM. NEOCAM will, if
approved, attempt to observe at low solar elongations. (A. Mainzer, personal
communication, September 26, 2011). With such technology, current efforts might
more quickly lead to a precursor mission to a small EI destined for impact decades to
centuries from now. A space-based constellation added to increased ground-based
technology, with automated target recognition and tracking technology, might also be a
means to handle the tremendous number of objects in the smallest of size bins, which
contains most likely next surprise impactor. Space-based assets can provide more
precise orbits of objects, due to being above atmospheric distortions and potentially
positioned better for observations. This would be a valuable addition for detection of
small objects, in the 25-100 m and 100-300 m range. As astronaut Rusty Schweickart
stated in a 2007 testimony to congress:
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It is an unfortunate reality that ground-based telescopic tracking produces, for
many challenging NEOs, discontinuous information; data dropouts may last for
several years at a time. . .The orbital phasing responsible for this interrupted
tracking can be eliminated by selecting any of several space-based search
options in NASA’s analysis to augment the ground-based systems. While
NASA reports that overall costs for space and ground tracking are comparable
(a controversial claim), the tracking quality provided by a telescope in a Venuslike orbit, in particular, is vastly superior. The dual-band IR telescope is
especially preferable since it also improves greatly our estimates of NEO mass
(and thus impact energy) (Schweickart, 2007, pp. 57-58) .
Recommendations
The following two charts represents our conclusions and recommended actions
for possible scenarios occurring out to 2200. The top entry (Highest, High, Medium,
Low, Negligible), gives their general estimate for the likelihood of that scenario taking
place within this time frame. Recommended actions after the discovery of the
impending EI are provided. Finally, recommendations for what to do to prepare for
each eventuality are provided, to include recommendations against preparing for
negligible chance events. For example, the highest probable scenario is that of a 25100 m object striking with no warning. The only actions available are recovery, and
potentially an attempt at last minute evacuation. Recommendations for reducing this
danger include improvements to detection and tracking technologies (through spaceand ground-based technologies), and preparations for recovery from such an event
within the emergency management system. Objects in this size range have a low
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probability of being detected long in advance because of the difficulties in resolving
their orbits. In the 100-300 m range, there is a lower total chance of a surprise EI
within this smaller population. However, the number of discoveries in this size bin is
quite high, so if an EI is in this population, there is a moderate chance of finding it well
in advance of its strike. Objects in this size range are numerous enough and pose
enough damage potential to merit recommending an on-call pre-built precursor mission
ready to deploy to the object quickly, followed by more long-term planning of a host of
pre- and post-observing missions and deflection missions. Another strong
recommendation is for the testing of a live deflection mission against such a small
NEA, albeit one that could not be deflected such that it would later hit the Earth!
Table 15. Actions and Preparatory Recommendations by Size, Warning Times
(<300 m).
Warning → →
Size/Danger
25-100 m:
-Large thermo
nuclear blast
- .3% high death
toll & damage in
air burst (38,000/km2)
- 12% Sparsely
populated land (050/ km2)
- 17% Lightly to
Moderately
populated

0- 1 year
warning
Most likely size
group
Action:
1. Trajectory
calculations
2. Warning
3. Evacuation
4. Recovery
Recommend:
-Improve detection/
tracking for precision
impact location

1- 30 years
warning
Action:
1. RADAR ground
observation
2. Precursor mission
3. Quick Follow-up
observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend: - On-call precursor
mission pre-built
- Design observation/
mitigation missions
- Conduct kinetic
deflection tests in space

- 71% water strikeno death/
damage
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30- 1000 years
warning
Action:
1. Extended RADAR/
ground observation
2. Precursor mission
3. Observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- Conduct space mission
design for precursor
missions to small PHAs
- Conduct kinetic deflection
tests in space

Table 15. Cont.
Warning → →
Size/Danger
100-300 m
- 71% water striketsunami with
coastal death/
damage
- 26% significant
land strike
(excludes
Antarctica)- local/
regional
destruction

0- 1 year → →
warning
Action:
1. Evacuation
2. Post-strike
recovery
Recommend:
-FEMA evac/
recovery prep
- Augment spacebased and ground
based observation
technology
- Improve
interplanetary lift
capabilities

1- 30 years → →
warning
Action:
1. RADAR/ground
observation
2. Immediate precursor
mission
3. Quick follow-up
observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- On-call precursor
mission built
- Design & Test
observation
mitigation missions

30- 1000 years
warning
Most likely size group
Action:
1. RADAR/ ground
observation
2. Precursor
3. Observation +
mitigation msn
Recommend:
-On-call precursor mission
-Design Observation/
mitigation missions

Note: The first column contains PHA size and estimate of damage levels. The second contains, at the
top, a ranking of this event occurring within the next several centuries, and actions to take if it does
occur. It also contains recommended advanced preparations to take to prepare for and prevent such an
event. The third and fourth columns contain the same, for longer warning time periods. The highest
chance event is a surprise EI under 100 m. A medium probability event is a 100-300 m EI with a very
long warning time (30-1000 year).

Events in the 300 m and larger size bins have low to negligible chances of
occurring; however, damage/death rates become so high projecting out all current orbits
for several millennia would be a very good step to allow for very long term observation
and mitigation planning.
Crash mitigation- observer missions (missions designed with urgency and very
little time) should be designed for objects in the 100-300 m range and the 25-100 m
range, in that order of precedence. Such crash missions would include nearsimultaneous low-budget solar-powered precursor missions accompanied by higherbudget observer and mitigation missions. Emergency management agencies such as
FEMA should design evacuation plans and post-impact recovery plans for objects in
the 25-100 m and 100-300 m range, in that order of precedence. For objects greater
than 500 m, emphasis should be on continuing to accelerate the discovery and orbital
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prediction for this limited population of NEAs out several centuries, to allow adequate
time for several deflection attempts.
Table 16. Actions and Preparatory Recommendations by Size, Warning Times
(>300 m).
Warning → →
Size/Danger
300-500 m
- Regional
destruction with
land or water
strike

500-1000 m
- Regional/
hemisphere
destruction with
land or water
strike

0- 1 year
warning
Action:
1. Evacuation
2. Post-strike
recovery
Recommend:
-Evac/ recovery prep
- Augment spacebased and ground
based observation
technology

Action:
1. Evacuation
2. Post-strike
recovery
Recommend:
- Increased
observation
technology

1- 30 years
warning
Action:
1. RADAR/ground
observation
2. Immediate precursor
mission
3. Quick follow-up
observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- On-call precursor
mission built
- Design & Test
observation &
mitigation missions
Action:
1. RADAR/ground
observation
2. Immediate precursor
mission
3. Quick follow-up
observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- Refine trajectories

30- 1000 years
warning
Action:
1. Extended RADAR/
ground observation
2. Precursor
3. Observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- On-call precursor mission
built
- Design observation/
mitigation msn

Action:
1. Extended RADAR/
ground observation
2. Precursor
3. Observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- Refine trajectories

>1000 m

Very low chance

Very low chance

Very low chance

- Global chaos,
long term struggle
to survive

Action:
1. Evacuation
2. Post-strike
recovery

Action:
1. RADAR/ground
observation
2. Immediate precursor
mission
3. Quick follow-up
observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- Refine trajectories

Action:
1. Extended RADAR/
ground observation
2. Precursor
3. Observation/
mitigation missions
Recommend:
- Refine trajectories

Recommend:
- Increased
observation
technology
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Summary and Conclusions
Throughout this analysis, the Department of Defense targeting cycle was
applied to the EI challenge. This application began with characterizing early warning
times for different size objects. An attempt was made to measure the success of the
Spaceguard efforts in increasing warning times for different size bodies, and along with
projections for future warning times for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID. In doing
so, a multi-step method to build a model consisting of aggregated differences in the
dates of first discovery and close approach was carried out, along with estimates for
missed approaches, projections of new discoveries, and estimates for high uncertainty
trajectory rates. Conclusions for PHAs of different sizes were provided. The most
significant of these conclusions was that the 100-300 m size range contains the most
likely EI we will discover with enough warning time to take some form of action.
Also provided were time frames as to when populations would reach enough
completion that a high percentage of 0.05 AU MOID warning times would grow to
greater than 30 years.
In the second half of the analysis, mission campaigns based on the results of the
first were discussed, to include specific focus on use of a precursor transponder mission
against small objects, likely in the 100-300 m size range. Recommendations against
different EI scenarios were provided, given different warning times and sizes. Overall,
the recommended campaigns included additional observation technology; an
inexpensive short-termed precursor transponder mission; a long-term observation
mission; and a suite of simultaneous observation and mitigation missions. A
conclusion is that additional resources should be allocated toward more robust survey
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technology, the first layer of defense, with continued development of precursor
characterization-transponder mission technology, the second layer of defense.
Another conclusion is that the Spaceguard effort has brought about the
beginnings of a true targeting process that could either be maintained within NASA or
spread out among the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security in
some ways, against the day that mitigation of an EI becomes a real necessity. NASA
began a process in 1998 that could result in an eventual successful mitigation of an EI.
However, without “finishing the job”, by far the most likely scenario, that of a small
object penetrating and striking with negligible warning time, will still occur. It is quite
possible, in fact that two situations will occur within the next few centuries. It is quite
possible that we will find and attempt to mitigate the threat of an EI with decades to
centuries of warning time (100-300 m diameter), and in the meantime have another
smaller EI (25-100 m diameter) hit us without warning. Now that the technology is
viable and the effort is expanding, the President and Congress would best serve our
country by allocating additional resources towards finishing the job.
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